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Executive Summary
Fiduciary obligation, under both corporate law and the common law, requires directors and
officers to identify and address climate-related financial and other risks. In fulfilling their
obligations to act in the best interests of the company, directors and officers must directly engage
with developments in knowledge regarding physical and transition risks related to climate change
and how these risks may impact their corporation. Depending on the firm’s economic activities,
the risk may be minor or highly significant, but directors and officers have an obligation to make
the inquiries, to devise strategies to address risks, and to have an ongoing monitoring to ensure
the strategies continue to be responsive to the risk. Directors’ fiduciary duty requires that they
have overseen and monitored the actions of the individuals charged with mitigation and
adaptation; and have mechanisms in place to respond rapidly to changes in the company’s risk
profile. In addition to fiduciary obligations, this study examines the statutory duty of care under
corporate law, which requires directors and officers to exercise the care, diligence and skills that a
reasonably prudent person would exercise in the circumstances. This duty requires directors and
officers to supervise and manage the transition that will address the specific risks, as well as the
new opportunities, posed by climate change.
The study also examines pension plan trustees and other investment fiduciaries in respect of their
fiduciary obligations related to climate change. Pension fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation
to pension beneficiaries to act prudently in their best interests in making investment decisions
regarding fund portfolios. In fulfilling their obligations to beneficiaries, pension trustees and their
investment managers have an obligation to identify and address climate-related financial
risk. Trustees can take climate change into account as a legitimate investment issue over the short
or long term or both. If trustees fail to act to address material climate change risk, they may be
personally liable for breach of their fiduciary obligation. Inaction is no longer acceptable, given all
the evidence that climate change risk is material across the entire economy. Trustees can also take
climate change into account because they have duties as public fiduciaries additional to their
financial duty to beneficiaries. Fiduciaries have a duty to act even where the potential costs and
benefits of climate change cannot be fully quantified immediately. Fiduciary obligation also
requires considering the benefits of investment in green adaption and mitigation technologies and
other products and services that are likely to have upside financial potential for return on
investment.

To date, there is no jurisprudence in Canada that expressly clarifies fiduciary obligation regarding
climate risk, but existing Supreme Court of Canada judgments make clear that the obligations of
fiduciaries are contextual and broad enough to recognize such a duty. The Supreme Court has held
that in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the
interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment,
as well as prevailing socio-economic conditions to inform their decisions. The statutory obligation
that directors act honestly and in good faith, and act diligently in supervising and managing the
corporation’s affairs, necessarily means that they must engage with the issues of physical and
transition climate change risks. In assessing violations of fiduciary obligations regarding climaterelated financial risk, the courts will look to see that the directors made a reasonable decision, not
a perfect decision. Provided that the decisions and the action taken to monitor, mitigate and/or
adapt with respect to climate risk is within a range of reasonableness, the courts are unlikely to
find personal liability. Yet while courts are reluctant to second-guess the application of business
expertise to the considerations involved in corporate decision making, they have made clear that
they will determine whether an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear
in reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at the time it was made.
While the existing statutory and common law obligations of all these fiduciaries are sufficient to
ground a fiduciary obligation to address climate-related financial risk, Canadian governments could
adopt legislation similar that enacted in France to require corporations, financial institutions, and
institutional investors, including mutual funds and pension funds, to disclose annually the financial
risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s measures to reduce them,
including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every component of their activities,
and how their corporate and investment decision-making is contributing to the energy and
ecological transition to limit global warming. Relevant for this study are the requirements that
institutional investors publish commitments on responsible investment regarding climate change
risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with their fiduciary duties.
Moving forward, fiduciaries should embed mitigation and adaptation strategies in their corporate
decisions and investment portfolio management, and report to shareholders, pension
beneficiaries and other stakeholders on how these commitments have been implemented and the
resultant outcomes. Companies should provide robust, credible and detailed accounts of their
management of climate risk. They should ensure that trustees, boards and executives have the
resources and knowledge to hold investment managers and advisers to account on climate-related
issues. The study also canvasses other avenues for holding directors accountable for failing to
address climate-related financial risk, including corporate law oppression remedies, personal and
derivative actions. It examines environmental liability in Canada for lessons that can be drawn for
climate-related litigation risk. The study offers a starting list of due diligence that fiduciaries could
undertake now to engage in proactive governance regarding climate-related financial risk.
The law as currently framed is a driver for positive action on climate change. While the focus of
the study is Canada, it draws on international developments and its key findings have broad
application internationally.
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Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change
Janis Sarra*

I. Introduction
The allocation of capital in business and investment have an impact on and are impacted by climate
change. This study examines the scope of duties of directors, officers, pension fund managers,
trustees and other fiduciaries in respect of climate change risk. While the focus is on Canadian
statutory and common law, the reasoning has broad application internationally, and is also
informed by recent international developments. The study concludes that a comprehensive
understanding of fiduciary obligation can facilitate, rather than constrain, the ability of directors,
officers and other fiduciaries to address the complex challenges of climate-related financial risk. It
provides an answer to concerns that consideration of climate change somehow places social
benefits before enterprise wealth maximization and maximization of the financial performance of
a fund’s investments. Fiduciary obligations require fiduciaries to make decisions based on a horizon
longer than the financial quarter or year and limited to profit/return on investment for such limited
period. Fiduciaries have a duty to identify and address the potential costs and benefits of climate
change risk, even where those costs and benefits cannot be fully quantified immediately.
Climate change represents a significant risk in financial and other markets; it could substantially
affect the valuation of many publicly listed companies and place some investment portfolios at
risk.1 Anthropogenic climate change - climate change due to the activities of humans - presents
the greatest challenge of this century. As 195 countries agreed in December 2015 in the first fullyglobal climate change agreement, “COP 21”,2 there is urgent need to reduce annual emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG)3 by 2020 if we are to have any hope of holding the increase in the global
average temperature to below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C

* My sincere thank you to the Ivey Foundation for providing financial support for this research. Many thanks to
participants at climate finance roundtable discussions in Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, who provided helpful
comments on the first draft of this research study. Thanks also to MaryGrace Johnstone for research assistance.
1 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017, online: WEF <http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/>.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Conference of the Parties (“COP 21”), Paris
Agreement, 12 December 2015, at 1,
unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, 11 December 2015 at para 137;
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. More than 174 countries have since ratified the agreement,
including Canada, http://unfccc.int/2860.php. On 5 October 2016, the threshold for entry into force of the Paris
Agreement was achieved. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016.
3 Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), “Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators Greenhouse Gas
Emissions”, 2017, https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=F60DB708-1. “Greenhouse
gases trap heat in the Earth's atmosphere, just as the glass of a greenhouse keeps warm air inside. Human activity
increases the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere, contributing to a warming of the Earth's surface. This is called the
enhanced greenhouse effect. Over the past 200 years in particular, humans have released GHGs into the atmosphere
primarily from burning fossil fuels. As a result, more heat is being trapped and the temperature of the planet is
increasing. Sea levels are rising as Arctic ice melts, and there are changes to the climate, such as more severe storms
and heat waves. All of this impacts the environment, the economy and human health”, at 5 (“ECCC Indicators”).
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in order to survive as a planet.4 Scientists have known about the serious risks to our planet from
anthropogenic climate change for more than 30 years.5 More than 800 scientists internationally
have recognized a strong scientific case for urgent and long-term action on climate change, calling
for fossil fuels to be phased out by 2100 and for immediate, substantial and sustained reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions.6 In meeting the COP 21 goals, two-thirds of the world’s fossil fuel
reserves will not be used and are at risk of becoming stranded assets, placing trillions of dollars of
shareholder value at risk.7 Canada’s economy faces significant risk in this respect. Canada is only
at a nascent stage of addressing climate change,8 and this moment in time presents an important
opportunity to shift the trajectory of our efforts to address climate change risk.
This study explores one important aspect of the transition to a low carbon economy, the fiduciary
obligations of directors, officers, pension fund managers, trustees and other fiduciaries to identify
and address climate change financial risk in their business operations and investment portfolios. It
suggests that corporate and pension laws, as currently framed, already create a fiduciary obligation
in respect of climate change. In fulfilling their duty to act in the best interests of companies,
directors and officers have an obligation to identify and address climate-related financial risk.
Pension and other investment fiduciaries, in fulfilling their obligations to beneficiaries, have an
obligation to identify and address climate-related financial risk. There are both statutory provisions
and a highly developed jurisprudence on fiduciary obligations in the business context in Canada.
The study examines why they are sufficient to ground a fiduciary obligation to address climaterelated financial risk. It examines whether it will take an appellate court judgment to generate
widespread adoption of this idea. It also explores whether legislators could act now to clarify the
scope of the duty, to help provide a roadmap for directors, encouraging them to take meaningful
action to transition towards a low-carbon economy.
While the legislation governing corporate directors and officers, and that governing pension funds
and other institutional investors, have different parameters, one point of intersection is the scope
of fiduciary obligation, and more specifically, that obligation in respect of climate-related risk. A
comprehensive analysis of fiduciary obligation and climate-related financial risk is therefore best
accomplished through the lens of multiple stakeholders implicated in financial markets. Hence, a
research study considering the duties of all these fiduciaries.
Part II of this report provides a description of the current state of fiduciary obligation in Canada.
Part III examines the fiduciary obligation of Canadian directors and officers, suggesting that as
framed, the current obligation to act in the best interests of the company includes the obligation
4

Ibid.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), “Climate Change 2014. Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability”, at 9, https://www.ipcc.ch/.
6 IPCC, 2014 Synthesis Report, http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/ar5/ar5_syr_headlines_en.pdf.
7 Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon, 2014, http://www.carbontracker.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1.pdf; Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership,
“Unhedgeable risk How climate change sentiment impacts investment”, 2015,
https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/publications/publication-pdfs/unhedgeable-risk.pdf.
8 Canadian governments and businesses are ahead of others in terms of thinking through the implications of climate
change risk, but overall, the country lags other efforts internationally: Howard Covington and Raj Thamotheram, “The
Case for Forceful Stewardship”, Part 1, 10 January 2015 working paper, SSRN-id2551478.
5
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to identify and address climate-related risk. This part also discusses the statutory duty of care and
corporate law oppression remedies as further avenues for holding directors accountable for failing
to address climate adaptation and mitigation. Part IV examines investment practices and fiduciary
obligation in respect of climate-related financial risk, including the obligations of pension fund
managers and trustees. While the jurisprudence on financial fiduciaries is not as developed as
obligations under corporate law, part IV engages in careful analysis of both statutory and common
law that does exist. It identifies a governance role for institutional investors and pension fiduciaries
in respect of tacking the challenges posed by climate change. Part V suggests that while the duty
currently exists, legislators in Canada could create greater certainty by clarifying the scope of
current statutory language. Part VI concludes.
The methodology for the study includes consideration of the statutory language governing
fiduciaries under corporate, securities, pension and trust law; the common law jurisprudence in
Canada and elsewhere; and international developments in climate-related financial risk and policy
and strategies to address it. Consultations were held with industry and financial stakeholder
groups in Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, and a draft of the study was circulated for comments.

II. Fiduciary Obligation in Canada – the Current State of the Law
Generally, a fiduciary relationship is “a relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for
the benefit of another person on matters within the scope of the relationship.”9 A fiduciary
obligation “arises in a relationship in which the fiduciary has a discretion or power to exercise, the
fiduciary can unilaterally exercise this discretion or power, and the beneficiary is vulnerable to, or
at the mercy of, the fiduciary.”10 The precise scope of a fiduciary’s duties depends on the nature
of the fiduciary’s relationship with one or more beneficiaries.11 A trustee, for instance, is in a
fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries of the trust. The trustee is expected to be loyal to the
beneficiaries in carrying out the trust obligations in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 12
Another long-accepted fiduciary relationship is that of an agent to the agent’s principal. An agent
is expected to act with care and in the best interests of the principal.
In terms of individuals and firms who manage other people’s money, their fiduciary obligation
requires them to act in the interests of beneficiaries, rather than serving their own interests,

9

See the definition of “fiduciary relationship” in Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed (St Paul, Minn: Thomson Reuters,
2009). Similarly, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) says that a “fiduciary duty” is “1.
One that arises in the context of a trust. 2. Certain relationships give rise to this type of duty: trustee and beneficiary,
guardian and ward, principal and agent. 3. A duty by which the law seeks to protect vulnerable persons in transactions
with others.” For a discussion see R Yalden, J Sarra, M Gillen, M Khimji, C Liao, P Patten, M Condon, G Campo, B Bryan
and M Deturbide, Business Organizations: Practice, Theory and Emerging Challenges (Toronto: Emond Montgomery,
2017) [“Yalden et al”].
10 Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 [“Lac Minerals”]. Dictionary of Canadian
Law, ibid.
11 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 384.
12 Yalden et al, supra note 9.
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including a duty of loyalty and a duty of prudence.13 The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to act
in good faith in the interests of their beneficiaries, impartially balance the conflicting interests of
different beneficiaries, avoid conflicts of interest, and a duty not to act for the benefit of
themselves or a third party. The prudential obligation requires fiduciaries to act with the care,
diligence and skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.14 Prior to
modern corporations statutes, directors were found to be in a fiduciary relationship with the
corporation and, therefore, required to exercise care in making management decisions with
respect to the corporation.15
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has held that there are certain common threads running
through fiduciary duties that arise from relationships marked by discretionary power and trust,
such as loyalty and “the avoidance of a conflict of duty and interest, and a duty not to profit at the
expense of the beneficiary”.16 This part examines fiduciary obligation through the lens of the
obligations of corporate directors and officers. However, the approach of the SCC in these
judgments offers valuable insights for pension trustees and other fiduciaries as well.

1. Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations
Corporate legislation in Canada has codified fiduciary duty provisions,17 which operate in tandem
with common law obligations. Corporate law specifies that directors and officers of corporations
incorporated under such statutes have a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.18

13

Ronald B Davis, Democratizing Pension Funds, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2008) at 54 [“Davis”].
14 See for example, the Ontario Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P 8 [OPBA], as amended, s 22(1).
15 Lac Minerals, supra, note 10.
16 Ibid.
17 See the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, as amended [CBCA], s 122(1). For corresponding
provisions in general statutes of incorporation of the provinces and territories, see the Alberta Business Corporations
Act, RSA 2000, c B-9 [ABCA], s 122(1); the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCBCA], s 142(1);
the Manitoba Corporations Act, CCSM c C225 [MCA], s 117(1); the New Brunswick Business Corporations Act, SNB
1981, c B-9.1 [NBBCA], s 79(1); the Newfoundland and Labrador Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36 [NLCA], s 203(1);
the Northwest Territories Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19 [NTBCA], s 123(1); the Nunavut Business
Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 1996, c 19 [NuBCA], s 123(1); the Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16
[OBCA], s 134(1); the Québec Business Corporations Act, CQLR c S-31.1 [QBCA], s 119; the Saskatchewan Business
Corporations Act, RSS 1978, c B-10 [SBCA], s 117(1); the Yukon Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20 [YBCA], s
124(1). The Nova Scotia Companies Act, RSNS 1989, c 81 and the Prince Edward Island Companies Act, RSPEI 1988, c C14 do not have a corresponding provision.
18 Section 122(1) of the CBCA, ibid, provides:
Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances.
For corresponding provisions in general statutes of incorporation of the provinces and territories, see ABCA, ibid, s
122(1); BCBCA, ibid, s 142(1); MCA, ibid, s 117(1); NBBCA, ibid, s 79(1); NLCA, ibid, s 203(1); NTBCA, ibid, s 123(1);
NuBCA, ibid, s 123(1); OBCA, ibid, s 134(1); QBCA, ibid, s 119; SBCA, ibid, s 117(1); YBCA, ibid, s 124(1).
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The primary role of directors is to manage, or supervise the management of, the business and
affairs of a corporation.19 The directors may appoint officers, specify their duties and delegate
powers to manage the corporation’s business and affairs.20 The Canada Business Corporations Act
(CBCA) and its sister corporations statutes in the provinces and territories establish duties to be
discharged by directors and officers in managing, or supervising the management of, the
corporation. Two components of the codified duties of directors and officers are the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care. The corporate statutory duty of loyalty requires that the directors and officers
of a corporation “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation.”21 The statutory duty of care requires that the directors and officers “exercise the
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances.”22 The SCC has held that it is the first of these duties that is the “statutory fiduciary
duty”.23 These duties are discussed in turn.

2. The Statutory Fiduciary Duty under Corporate Law
The SCC has held that the statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly
and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.24 It has held that considerable
power over the deployment and management of financial, human and material resources is vested
in the directors and officers of corporations. In deciding to invest in, lend to or otherwise deal with
a corporation, shareholders and creditors transfer control over their assets to the corporation, and
hence to the directors and officers, in the expectation that the directors and officers will use the
corporation’s resources to make reasonable business decisions that are to the corporation’s
advantage.25 Directors and officers must respect the trust and confidence that have been reposed
in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the objects of the
corporation.26 They must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and loyally.27
In considering the specific substance of the fiduciary duty based on the relationship of directors to
corporations, the SCC held that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be read
not simply as the “best interests of the shareholders”; that from an economic perspective, the
“best interests of the corporation” means the maximization of the value of the corporation, but
that various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors should consider in

19

Section 102(1), CBCA, ibid.
Section 121, CBCA, ibid. Subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement and several other provisions of the
statute.
21 CBCA, ibid, s 122(1)(a); ABCA, supra note 17, s 122(1)(a); BCBCA, supra note 17, s 142(1)(a); MCA, supra note 17, s
117(1)(a); NBBCA, supra note 17, s 79(1)(a); NLCA, supra note 17, s 203(1)(a); NTBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1)(a);
NuBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1)(a); OBCA, supra note 17, s 134(1)(a); QBCA, supra note 17, s 119; SBCA, supra note 17,
s 117(1)(a); YBCA, s 124(1)(a).
22 Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [“Peoples Department Stores”].
23 Ibid at paras 34-35, citing s 122(1), CBCA, supra note 17.
24 Ibid at para 32.
25 Ibid at para 34.
26 Ibid at para 35. They must avoid conflicts of interest with the corporation. They must avoid abusing their position to
gain personal benefit. They must maintain the confidentiality of information they acquire by virtue of their position.
27 Ibid at para 35.
20
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soundly managing with a view to the best interests of the corporation.28 The SCC held that: “We
accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to
the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given
case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees,
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”29
The SCC held that the various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation’s fortunes rise
and fall do not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary duty - at all times, directors and officers
owe their fiduciary obligation to the corporation.30 The Court further held that “In using their skills
for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors must be
careful to attempt to act in its best interests by creating a “better” corporation, and not to favour
the interests of any one group of stakeholders.”31
In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, the SCC reiterated its holding in Peoples Department Stores
that “In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the
interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.32 The SCC held that:
The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is
not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing
concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this duty
varies with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the directors to ensure that
the corporation meets its statutory obligations. But, depending on the context, there may
also be other requirements. In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is
mandatory; directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.33
The SCC further held that, in executing its duty of loyalty to the corporation, the board of directors
was required to reflect on the interests of the corporation both as an economic actor and as a
“good corporate citizen”.34

3. The Duty of Care under Corporate Law
The second obligation, the duty of care, imposes a legal obligation on directors and officers to be
diligent in supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs.35 That directors must satisfy a duty
of care is a long-standing principle of the common law, although the duty of care has been
28

Ibid at para 42.
Ibid at para 42.
30 Ibid at para 43.
31 Ibid at para 47. The SCC held that if the stakeholders cannot avail themselves of the statutory fiduciary duty (the
duty of loyalty), to sue the directors for failing to take care of their interests, they have other means at their disposal.
32 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 39, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [“BCE”], citing Peoples Department
Stores, supra note 22.
33 Ibid at para 38.
34 Ibid at para 66.
35 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 32.
29
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reinforced by statute to become “more demanding”.36 The SCC held that unlike the statutory
fiduciary obligation, the statement of the duty of care in s 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not
specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty.37 Instead, it provides that
“[e]very director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties
shall . . . exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in
comparable circumstances.” Thus, the identity of the beneficiary of the duty of care is much more
open-ended.38 The SCC held that the statutory duty of care requires more of directors and officers
than the traditional common law duty of care. The standard by which to assess their conduct is
objective; thus, the factual aspects of the circumstances surrounding the actions of the director or
officer are important to assessing whether directors met their duty of care.39
The SCC held that “the contextual approach dictated by s.122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only
emphasizes the primary facts, but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be taken
into consideration.”40 Many decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately
unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made, and when challenged, the
courts will look to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect decision.
Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute
its opinion for that of the board, even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the
board’s determination.41 In order for a plaintiff to succeed in challenging a business decision, he
or she has to establish that the directors acted (i) in breach of the duty of care and (ii) in a way that
caused injury to the plaintiff; and directors and officers will not be held to be in breach of the duty
of care if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis.42 The decisions they make must
be reasonable business decisions in light of all the circumstances about which the directors or
officers knew or ought to have known.43
In most circumstances, the court’s analysis of whether directors and officers have met their duty
of care involves an inquiry into the process undertaken by the directors or board of directors in
making the decision and the procedures they have in place to identify and address problems, not
an inquiry into the substance of the decision where the complaint is not directly related to a
specified statutory violation.44
36

Ibid at para 59.
Ibid at para 57.
38 Ibid. The SCC held that this result is clearly consistent with the civil law interpretation of the word “another”; thus, if
breach of the standard of care, causation and damages are established, creditors can resort to article 1457 to have
their rights vindicated.
39 Ibid. As opposed to the subjective motivation of the director or officer, which the SCC held is the central focus of the
statutory fiduciary duty of s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA, supra note 17.
40 Ibid at para 64. It held that the establishment of good corporate governance rules should be a shield that protects
directors from allegations that they have breached their duty of care.
41 Ibid at para 64.
42 Ibid at para 67.
43 Ibid at para 67.
44 Even where a director does not take a position at a board meeting, he or she can be held accountable for a decision
of the board. For example, CBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1) provides that a director who is present at a meeting of
directors or a committee of directors, is deemed to have consented to any resolution passed or action taken at the
meeting unless the director’s dissent has been entered in the minutes of the meeting, the director requests that a
dissent be entered in the minutes, the director sends a written dissent to the secretary of the meeting before the
37
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The SCC has held that courts should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business
expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making.45 However, the SCC
also held that courts “are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in reaching what is claimed to be a
reasonable business decision at the time it was made”.46 The SCC has clearly signaled that the
courts have the capacity and the responsibility to consider factors such as prudence and diligence
when assessing corporate decision-making.
Important for the Canadian context is the interplay of the Civil Code of Québec (Civil Code) and
corporations law, since directors’ and officers’ obligations fall under both common law and civil
law in Québec. The SCC in Peoples Department Stores held that the Civil Code is used as suppletive
law, in that directors have been held liable to creditors in respect of either contractual or
extracontractual obligations.47 The SCC held that three elements of article 1457 Civil Code are
relevant to the integration of the director’s duty of care into the principles of extra-contractual
liability: who has the duty (“every person”), to whom is the duty owed (“another”) and what breach
will trigger liability (“rules of conduct”). Directors and officers come within the expression “every
person” and “another” can include the creditors. The reach of article 1457 Civil Code is broad, and
it has been given an open and inclusive meaning. Thus, in Québec, directors and officers can be
found to have violated a duty of care under both corporate law and the Civil Code.
The scope of directors’ obligations was affirmed by the SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders,
noting that, “under the business judgment rule, deference should be accorded to business
decisions taken in good faith and in the performance of the functions they were elected to
perform.”48
In Canada, therefore, the law is clear that directors owe their duty of loyalty to the corporation.
The SCC has also confirmed that, in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation,
directors can consider the interests of multiple stakeholders.49 The trend of Canadian

meeting is adjourned, or the director sends a dissent by registered mail or delivers it to the registered office of the
corporation immediately after the meeting is adjourned. This provision addresses the contours of the fiduciary
obligation when directors fail to dissent or disagree with a decision of the board. See also: ABCA, supra note 17, s
123(2); BCBCA, supra note 17, s 154(6); MCA, supra note 17, s 118(2); NBBCA, supra note 17, s 80(2); NLCA, supra note
17, s 204(2); NTBCA, supra note 17, s 124(2); NuBCA, supra note 17, s 124(2); OBCA, supra note 17, s 139(2); QBCA,
supra note 17, s 139; SBCA, supra note 17, s 118(2); YBCA, supra note 17, s 125(2).
45 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 67.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid at para 54. The SCC held that contractual liability arises where the director personally guarantees a contractual
obligation of the company. Liability also arises where the director personally acts in a manner that triggers his or her
extra-contractual liability. Article 1457 Civil Code of Québec, c CCQ-1991 (CCQ): “Every person has a duty to abide by
the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to
another. Where he is endowed with reason and fails in this duty, he is responsible for any injury he causes to another
person by such fault and is liable to reparation for the injury, whether it be bodily, moral or material in nature. He is
also liable, in certain cases, to reparation for injury caused to another by the act or fault of another person or by the
act of things in his custody.” Ibid at para 55.
48 BCE, supra note 32 at para 99.
49 Yalden et al, supra note 9 at 51.
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jurisprudence in respect of directors’ fiduciary obligations makes clear that the duty can include
obligations in respect of climate change risk.

III. Why Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligation Requires Attention to Climate Change Risk
Reduction
Most Canadian directors and officers have only recently turned their attention to climate change
risk. Canada, as a federal system, has very uneven levels of commitment to addressing climate
change. Some corporations, investment funds and governments are exhibiting leadership, others
are not.
Thus, there is a lag in addressing these issues, in comparison to other jurisdictions. The reasons are
complex, but two primary reasons are the temporal nature of climate change and the reliance of
the Canadian economy on fossil fuel production and use. With Canada’s vast natural resources, it
is difficult for Canadians to comprehend that decisions made today will continue a trajectory
towards severe harm to the climate in the longer term.50 Coupled with pressure on directors and
officers, particularly of publicly-traded companies, to realize short-term profits, there is a
disconnect between the responsibilities of companies to address climate change and market
pressure to realize return on investment over very short periods.51 Absent pressure by
shareholders and other stakeholders to hold directors and officers accountable, changes in
businesses’ behaviour will be slower than is required to meet the COP 21 urgent challenges.52
While the harmful effects of fossil fuels and GHG emissions are now well-documented, Canadian
fiduciaries face the challenge that Canada’s fossil fuel sector generates 7.7% of Canada’s GDP,53
and thus they are heavily invested in a sector that has only a limited future.54 In 2010, Canada
exported $85 billion in value of crude oil, refined petroleum products and natural gas.55 Oil
production in Canada increased by over 50% in the past decade.56 The United States (“US”) Energy
Information Association estimates that energy consumption is rising globally for all fuels, except

50

Janis Sarra and Sally Aitken, “A Greener Future”, in P Tortell, M Young and P Nemetz, eds, Reflections of Canada
(Vancouver, UBC, 2017) at 24-32 [“Sarra and Aitken”].
51 Exacerbated by requirement to disclose quarterly returns.
52 This point is discussed in part IV below.
53 Natural Resources Canada, “Energy Factbook 2016-2017”,
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/EnergyFactBook_2016_17_En.pdf, at 5 (“Energy
Factbook 2016-2017”); Mark Carney, “Resolving the climate paradox”, Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture, Berlin, 22
September 2016, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech923.pdf, at 9. See
also Natural Resources Canada, “National Economic Performance”, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/publications/statisticsfacts/1239 (“Natural Resources Canada”).
54 “Energy Factbook 2016-2017” supra note 53 at 5: Oil and Gas generates 3.9% of employment, 700,000 jobs.
55 Natural Resources Canada, supra note 53. 99% of Canadian crude oil exports are to the US, and Canada is the largest
foreign supplier of crude oil to the US, accounting for 43% of total US crude oil imports and for 20% of US refinery
crude oil intake; “Energy Factbook 2016-2017” supra note 53 at 31.
56 Lawrence McKeown, Corben Bristow and Anthony Caouette, “Canada’s shifting sands: Oil production, distribution
and implications, 2005 to 2014”, Environment, Energy and Transportation Statistics Division, Statistics Canada (12 July
2016), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-002-x/2016002/article/14629-eng.pdf, at 1.
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coal.57 Production growth continues in numerous countries, including Canada.58 Canada’s
predicted 1.26 million b/d increase in production by 2040 mainly comes from oil sands
production.59 Nicholas Stern observes that delays in taking immediate action to mitigate climate
change will amount to a decline of 5 to 10% of worldwide GDP, but the reduction in GDP will only
be 1 to 2% if action is taken now; thus, any delay now poses a substantial financial risk.60
Consumption is also an important part of the challenge.61 In 2015, Canada's total GHG emissions
were 722 megatonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2 eq”). The oil and gas sector was the
largest GHG emitter in Canada, accounting for 26% of total GHG emissions, followed closely by the
transportation sector, which emitted 24% of total emissions.62 The other Canadian economic
sectors: buildings, electricity, heavy industry, agriculture, and waste, each accounted for between
7% and 12% of total GHG emissions in Canada.63 Emissions of GHG from the oil and gas sector
have increased 76% since 1990, mostly attributable to the increased production of crude oil and
the expansion of the oil sands industry.64 The oil sands alone account for 9.3% of Canada’s total
GHG emissions.65

57

US Energy Information Association, International Energy Outlook 2017, 14 September 2017, www.eia.gov/ieo (“EIA
International Energy Outlook”). It predicts that most of the growth in world liquid fuels consumption from 2015 to
2040 will come from non-OECD countries, where strong economic and population growth increase the demand for
liquid fuel; and that more than 80% of the total increase in liquid fuels consumption will be in non-OECD Asia, as China
and India experience rapid industrial growth and increased demand for transportation. In OECD countries, it predicts
that the demand for liquid fuels will grow slowly or decline between 2015 and 2040, at 35-36. The US Energy
Administration, “Short Term Energy Outlook”, 11 October 2017,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.cfm, suggests that the short time outlook for Canada is stable
production, not a large growth.
58 The EIA International Energy Outlook 2017, ibid at 40, reports that world liquid fuels production are expected to rise
by 16.1 million b/d from 2015 to 2040, with more than half of the increase coming from a 10.3 million b/d increase in
crude oil and lease condensate, including production from tight and non-tight resources, and extra-heavy crude oils
and processed bitumen from oil sands from OPEC member countries; and that production of other liquids (natural gas
plant liquids, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, oil shale, refinery gain, and biofuels) will increase by 4.2 million b/d (25%)
from 2015 to 2040.
59 Ibid at 44.
60 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (IPCC: 2014), <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf>.
61 Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, 9 December 2016,
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html. 80% of
Canada’s GHG emissions are caused by the production and use of energy.
62 Emissions from passenger and freight travel amounted to 96% of these emissions, ECCC Indicators, supra note 3 at
9. There have been improvements in the fuel efficiency of both passenger cars and light trucks over the last few
decades, but they were not sufficient to offset the increases in emissions due to the change in composition of the
vehicle fleet.
63 Ibid at 8.
64 Ibid at 9. “GHG emissions from conventional oil production have increased by 26%, while emissions from oil sands
production have increased more than fourfold. About half of the increase in emissions from oil sands production over
this period came from the growth of in situ production. A temporary decrease in GHG emissions between 2008 and
2011 is mostly attributable to the world economic downturn that resulted in a lower global demand for petroleum
products.” 61% of Canada’s oil production in 2015 was in the oil sands, with an estimated $271 billion of capital
investment to date, including $22.5 billion in 2015, Energy Factbook 2016-2017, supra note 53 at 34.
65 Energy Factbook 2016-2017, ibid at 35.
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However, overall, Environment and Climate Change Canada reports that the level of emissions per
unit of gross domestic product (GDP) was 33% lower in 2015 than in 1990.66 These improvements
are attributable to a number of factors such as more efficient industrial processes, a shift to a more
service-based economy and a decrease in the emissions associated with energy generation, such
as realized through fuel switching.67 As one industry leader noted, given heavy reliance on oil and
natural gas, at least Canada is producing under some of the highest environmental standards in
the world and is actively developing cleaner technologies.
The impact of climate change on Canadian cities is not yet as visible as it is in the far north, away
from population centres, such that it is not obvious that Canada has a higher rate of warming than
most other regions of the world and the risks are great.68 Moreover, since Canada’s economy is
heavily dependent on the very resources that generate some of the most egregious GHG
emissions, our capital markets are directly implicated in both the risk-generating activity and the
potential to mitigate the risks. The influence of the GHG producing industry in Canada’s capital
markets is exacerbated by the temporal mismatch between the climate change risks and the
temporal horizons of investors. While some investors are interested in the long-term sustainability
of firms, there are significant investors that press for short-term returns that maximize value to
them but create risks to the firm overall.
There has also historically been a perception that alternative business pathways are not as
profitable. However, as renewable energy and other technologies become more profitable, for
example, renewable energy sources currently provide 19% of Canada’s total primary energy
supply, directors and officers may recognize that adaptation can align with the corporation’s longterm success.
There are mismatched timelines between capital markets’ need for profit, directors’ and officers’
obligations to act in the best interests of the company, and Canada’s need for long-term
sustainability of its economy.69 Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has called climate risk a
“tragedy of the horizon”, in that the most serious consequences of today’s emissions will
eventuate beyond the time-frame of current business and regulatory cycles.70 He has observed
that: “the catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of
most actors – imposing a cost on future generations that the current generation has no direct
incentive to fix.”71 The Bank identified three types of financial risk: “physical risks” that arise from
increased frequency and severity of climate-related and weather-related events that damage
66

ECCC, supra note 3 at 6: “Over that period, GHG per unit of gross domestic product decreased from 0.62
megatonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) per $billion gross domestic product in 1990 to 0.41 Mt CO2 eq
per $billion gross domestic product in 2015. The amount of GHGs emitted per person in Canada decreased to 20.1
tonnes CO2 eq in 2015, compared with 22.1 tonnes CO2 eq in 1990.”
67 Ibid.
68 Government of Canada, Impacts of Climate Change, 27 November 2015,
http://climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=036D9756-1
69 Janis Sarra, “The Anthropocene at the Time of Trump” (forthcoming, UBC Law Review, 2018) [“Sarra,
Anthropocene”].
70 Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon- climate change and financial stability”, Bank of England (29
September 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx# at 3 [“Carney”].
71 Ibid.
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property and disrupt trade; “transition risks” resulting from adjustment towards a lower-carbon
economy; and “liability risks” from parties seeking compensation for suffering loss from the effects
of climate change from those individuals and entities they hold responsible.72 Changes in policy,
technology and physical risks could prompt reassessment of the value of a large range of assets,
which may affect financial stability.
Building on the Bank of England’s insights, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) has reported that climate-related risks fall into two
major categories: (1) risks related to the transition to a lower-carbon economy and (2) risks related
to the physical impacts of climate change.73 It suggests that transitioning to a lower-carbon
economy may entail extensive policy, legal, technology, and market changes to address mitigation
and adaptation requirements related to climate change; and such risks pose varying levels of
financial and reputational risk to organizations.74 Policy aimed at constraining actions that
contribute to the adverse effects of climate change, or aimed at promoting adaptation to climate
change, include: implementing carbon-pricing mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions, shifting
energy use toward lower emission sources, adopting energy-efficiency solutions, and promoting
more sustainable land-use practices.75 The TCFD observes that litigation risk is on the rise, with an
increase in climate-related litigation claims being brought before the courts by shareholders, public
interest organizations, institutional investors and others. These lawsuits are often filed due to the
failure of organizations to mitigate impacts of climate change, failure to adapt to climate change,
and the insufficiency of disclosure around material financial risks.76 It observes that as the value of
loss and damage arising from climate change grows, litigation risk will also likely increase.
Technology risk is also part of transition risk, as technological innovations that support the
transition to a lower-carbon, energy-efficient economic system can have a significant impact on
organizations. The TCFD points to emerging technologies such as renewable energy, energy
efficiency, and carbon capture and storage, all of which will affect the competitiveness of certain
corporations, their production and distribution costs, and demand for their products and
services.77 Part of the risk is that new technology will displace old systems and disrupt some parts
of the existing economic system. The timing of technological development and deployment is a
key uncertainty in assessing technology risk. Market risk is also a factor, in terms of shifts in supply
and demand for certain commodities, products and services, as climate-related risks and
opportunities are increasingly taken into account.78 The final transition risk is reputational risk, in
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Ibid. An example of this latter risk is ExxonMobil, which is under investigation in the US for misleading the public on
climate change research; Bradley Olson and Aruna Diswantha, “SEC Probes Exxon Over Accounting for Climate
Change”, The Wall Street Journal (20 September 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-investigating-exxon-onvaluing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593.
73 Financial Stability Board, Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Final Report, Recommendations of the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-recommendationsreport/ at 5 (“TCFD Final Report”).
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, citing Peter Seley, “Emerging Trends in Climate Change Litigation,” Law 360, 7 March 2016.
77 Ibid at 6.
78 Ibid.
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terms of changing customer or community perceptions of a corporation’s contribution to, or
detraction from, the transition to a lower-carbon economy.79
The second major risk identified by TCFD is physical risk resulting from climate change, which can
be event driven (acute) or longer-term shifts (chronic) in climate patterns.80 Physical risks may have
financial implications for organizations, such as direct damage to assets and indirect impacts from
supply chain disruption, changes in availability of sourcing and quality of water and other inputs,
extreme temperature changes affecting organizations’ premises, operations, supply chain,
transport needs, and employee safety.81
It is easy to see how each of these risks may manifest themselves in Canadian corporations. In
terms of physical risks, Canada’s arctic is one place where these manifestations of climate change
are most pronounced, with the far north already experiencing “polar amplification”.82 If the
weather and climate effects continue to spread, there will be additional costs from flooding,
drought, fires, and loss of supply sources.
The transition risks are already becoming clear. Alberta has recently seen a large growth in orphan
wells (1391 as of March 2017), due to low commodity prices, environmental factors and an
unprecedented number of corporate failures in the oil and gas sector.83 There has been an 80%
increase in these stranded assets.84 One can project similar impacts if the Paris COP21 agreement
targets begin to be reached. Such risks accrue directly to corporations, but also to particular
sectors, such as the oil and gas sector. The risks and attendant costs can also accrue to
governments and to taxpayers as a whole, where there is no one else to pay for remediation of
these stranded assets.
Liability risk is also possible from parties seeking compensation for suffering loss from the effects
of climate change from those directors and officers they hold responsible, although to date, the
type of litigation brought in the US and other countries has not yet materialized in Canada. For
example, in the US, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP has commenced a class action on behalf
of purchasers of Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon") common stock during the period between 19
79

Ibid.
Ibid.
81 Ibid at 6. It reports that acute physical risks refer to those risks that are event-driven, including increased severity of
extreme weather events, such as cyclones, hurricanes, or floods; and chronic physical risks refer to longer-term shifts
in climate patterns (e.g., sustained higher temperatures) that may cause sea level rise or chronic heat waves.
82 Sarra and Aitken, supra note 50; “Polar amplification” describes greater climate change near the north pole, Arctic
warming is already highly significant and substantial.
83 Unprecedented at least in the past 30 years.
84 In the upstream oil and gas industry, an orphan is a well, pipeline, facility or associated site that has been
investigated and confirmed as not having any legally responsible and/or financially able party to deal with its
abandonment and reclamation responsibilities. Orphan Well Association, Annual Report 2016-2017,
http://www.orphanwell.ca/OWA%202016-17%20Ann%20Rpt%20Final.pdf at 13. See also:
http://www.orphanwell.ca/pg_faq.html. One commentator has observed that the number of orphan wells is more
attributable to a judgment in which federal insolvency legislation “trumped” provincial legislation remedying orphan
wells. While that judgment has serious implications for how such wells are dealt with, and the extent to which tax
dollars will be required to remediate these stranded assets, the judgment itself is unlikely to have caused an uptick in
the number of stranded assets.
80
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February 2016 and 27 October 2016.85 The complaint alleges that Exxon and its directors and
officers violated the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in making materially false and misleading
public statements. It alleges that they failed to disclose that Exxon's own internally generated
reports concerning climate change recognized the risks associated with global warming and
climate change, the inability of the company to extract existing hydrocarbon reserves and
therefore, a material portion of Exxon's reserves were stranded and should have been written
down; and that Exxon had employed an inaccurate price of carbon in evaluating the value of its
future oil and gas prospects, materially overstating the value of its reserves.86 In September 2016,
the market learned that federal regulators were actively scrutinizing Exxon's reserve accounting
related to climate change and its refusal to write down any of its oil and gas reserves in the face of
declining global oil prices.87 On these disclosures, the price of Exxon common stock fell than 13%
from the stock's class period high, erasing billions of dollars of market capitalization.88
Even where there are not lawsuits, Williams and Conley suggest that extra-legal pressure
generated from highly publicized problems with stakeholders create risks to companies'
reputations and therefore to the value of their brands.89 Such pressure may be stronger
mechanisms of enforcement of environmental risk than the risks of actual liability in a court
proceeding.
Carney cautioned that “too rapid a movement towards a low-carbon economy could materially
damage financial stability”.90 In that respect, directors and officers should be taking immediate
action to identify risks, but materiality, remoteness and downside risk of transitioning should also
be careful considerations. Fiduciary obligation also requires considering the benefits of investment
in green adaption and mitigation technologies and other products and services that are likely to
have upside financial potential.
The statutory obligation that directors act honestly and in good faith, and act diligently in
supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs, necessarily means that they must engage with
the issues of physical and transition climate change risks. Depending on the firm’s economic
activities, the risk may be minor or highly significant, but directors and officers have an obligation
to make the inquiries, to devise strategies to address risks, and to have an ongoing monitoring and
adjusting plan to ensure the strategy continues to be responsive to the risk. The SCC has expressly
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Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, “Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP Files Class Action Suit Against Exxon Mobil
Corporation”, 7 November 2016, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/exxon/; Ramirez v Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al, No
16-cv-3111, Northern District of Texas, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/robbins-geller-rudman--dowd-llpfiles-class-action-suit-against-exxon-mobil-corporation-300358768.html.
86 Ibid.
87 Through a series of partial disclosures issued by different news sources between mid-August 2016 and late
September 2016. Ibid.
88 It fell to USD 82.54 per share on September 20, 2016. Ibid.
89 Cynthia Williams and John Conley, “Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?” (2005) 74 U Cin
L Rev 75 at 77. See also Pratima Bansal, “Evolving Sustainably: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Sustainable
Development”, (2005) 26 Strategic Mgmt J 197.
90 Carney, supra note 70 at 2. He observes: “A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are reevaluated, could destabilize markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallization of losses and lead to a persistent tightening of
financial conditions.”
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approved the ability of directors to take account of the interests of diverse stakeholders.91
Directors’ decisions must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the circumstances about
which they knew or ought to have known.92 Directors are given broad authority to address climate
change risk, and provided that decisions taken are within a range of reasonableness, the courts
will defer to their business judgment.93
Addressing climate risk is the responsibility of directors and officers in determining the best
interests of the corporation. In addition to this fiduciary obligation, the duty of care requires
directors and officers to exercise the care, diligence and skills that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in the circumstances; and arguably, this duty requires directors and officers to
identify and develop a strategy to supervise and manage the transition that will address the specific
risks posed by climate change.
The crucial question of what are the best interests of the corporation in respect of climate change
risk requires directors and officers to directly engage with developments in knowledge regarding
physical and transition risks and how that information may impact their corporation. As discussed
above, fiduciaries can consider the interests of numerous types of stakeholders and the
environment when determining how to act in the corporation’s best interest in respect of climate
change. Directors and officers who engage in good governance practices already take account of
socio-economic conditions and the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests of all the
stakeholders with an interest in the company. Ronald Davis has observed that:
While shareholder wealth maximization as a goal of corporate activity has an appealing
simplicity to it, the simplicity is deceiving. Conceptually it contains a level of indeterminacy that
continues to raise issues of the proper exercise of corporate power, the balance between
interests of investors with differing time horizons, and the appropriate concern to be shown
to stakeholders other than shareholders by corporate management…. the range of options on
corporate management’s desk rarely involves the following decision pairs - profit, only if
socially irresponsible versus no profit, only if socially responsible. Providing one takes into
account all consequences that can reasonably be expected to occur over the foreseeable
future, having only these choices before one is rare. These rare choices will be provided only
if one is focused solely on the immediate cost and benefit, to the exclusion of all other costs
and benefits.” 94
As also discussed above, the SCC has recognized that directors and officers need to look to the
long-term interests of the corporation. As long as the decision was a reasonable one at the time,
courts will defer to directors’ decisions. That means that where directors and officers are duly
diligent in trying to identify climate-related financial and other risks, and take action to mitigate
91

Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 34. The Court further held that in determining whether directors
are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation, it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a
given case, for the board of directors to consider the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors,
consumers, governments, and the environment, at para 42.
92 Ibid at para 67.
93 Ibid at paras 64 and 65.
94 Davis, supra note 13 at 175.
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and adapt, they will not face personal liability risk. Acting prudently and on a reasonably informed
basis is what is required. At the same time, failure to consider climate change risk does leave
directors and officers open to actions against the corporation and in some cases, the directors and
officers personally.

1. The Fiduciary Obligation Involves Corporate Citizenship
In Canada, the scope of fiduciary obligation in the business context goes beyond mere survival of
the corporate entity. The SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders held that directors and officers
must treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as
a responsible corporate citizen.95 The SCC held that directors should resolve conflicts among
stakeholders or between them and the corporation “in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen”.96 Thus, a director’s
fiduciary duty implicates considerations of what “good” corporate citizenship requires in the
context of climate change. Climate change risk poses a challenge made complex by the growing
degree of interdependence and interconnectedness that have come to define our world, where
domestic and sectoral regulation no longer provide adequate instruments to deal with public
stewardship challenges.97 Directors’ responses to these challenges should accord with their duty
to conform to good corporate citizenship.
As noted in the introduction, the COP 21 agreement recognizes that deep reductions in global
emissions through both climate adaption and remediation are required and urgent.98 Both the
risks posed by climate change and recent governmental commitment to its remediation create
reasonable expectations by citizens that legal and other processes will advance these public policy
objectives.99 Reasonable expectations have been used to achieve objectives that are remarkably
consistent, requiring the fair treatment of others and upholding the integrity of legal or regulatory
regimes by closing the gaps and loopholes that allow avoiding the obligations associated with these
regimes.100 A focus on systemic risks acknowledges interdependencies and requires that decisionmakers act with reference to others in society and to the principles that inform “reasonable
expectations”. These principles – fair treatment of others as well as upholding the integrity of legal
regimes – are concerned with the protection or enhancement of the public good.101 These
expectations can also inform a judgment as to what constitutes “good” corporate citizenship in the
context of climate change when evaluating whether directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duty.
John Rawls envisioned society as a fair system of social cooperation over time that reflects a notion
95

BCE, supra note 32 at paras 80, 81.
Ibid at paras 81, 111.
97 Edward Waitzer and Douglas Sarro, “Fiduciary Society Unleased: The Road Ahead for the Financial Sector” (2014).
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 10. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/10 [“Waitzer and
Sarro”].
98 Janis Sarra and Edward Waitzer, “Climate Change – A Case Study/Tipping Point for Rebalancing Interests in
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96

16

of reciprocity or mutuality, passed inter-generationally, guided by publicly recognized rules and
agreed upon standards.102 He observed that if individuals had to determine distribution of goods
or treatment of others ignorant of where they would fall within that distribution, they would strive
for a more equitable distribution for everyone.103 Viewing climate change in this way, the SCC’s
direction that fiduciaries are to act to as good corporate citizens has relevance for the allocation
of both the benefits and costs of addressing climate change financial risk equitably across society.
Directors and officers should understand that their fiduciary duty requires that they have
undertaken efforts to identify any relevant risks to their business from climate change and climate
change policies; that they have put appropriate strategies in place to manage these risks; that they
have overseen and monitored the actions of the individuals charged with managing these risks;
and have mechanisms in place to respond rapidly to changes in the company’s risk profile.
Considering whether climate change poses a risk to the business requires directors to take account
of the business sector, sources of energy, direct carbon emissions, benefits and risks of investing
to support a lower carbon infrastructure, best environmental practices in terms of regulatory
compliance, and integration of asset climate risk and resiliency in the firm’s investment decision
making.
Given the broad mandate of directors and officers under their statutory fiduciary obligation and
their duty of care, specific decisions made to address climate change are unlikely to give rise to
personal liability. It is the failure to act that is likely to attract liability, given the reasonable
expectations of stakeholders, either through derivative actions on behalf of the company or
personal actions against directors and officers. Courts will examine directors’ decisions balancing
competing interests, but once a decision is found to be reasonable, it will be upheld. Measuring
fulfillment of directors’ duties against reasonable expectations serves not only as an accountability
check, but it may also provide evidence that directors have met their statutory and common law
obligations, and thus provide a defence against shareholder and other claims of breach of those
obligations.
Under Canadian corporate statutes, the “oppression remedy” is a powerful potential tool for
specified stakeholders to press for climate action.

2. The Oppression Remedy
The oppression remedy under Canadian corporate law focuses on harm to the legal and equitable
interests of stakeholders when directors act oppressively or unfairly prejudicially.104 If directors act
in a manner that is oppressive or unfair prejudicial, an extraordinarily broad set of remedies is
available to complainants bringing such claims to the courts.
However, there are limits to who can bring a complaint and from what harm they can seek relief.
Oppression remedies offer another potential mechanism for the courts to assess the reasonable
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expectations of certain stakeholders in respect of directors’ decisions or lack thereof regarding
climate change risk. The oppression remedy under corporate law statutes creates an equitable
remedy that “seeks to ensure fairness – what is just and equitable”.105
In establishing that directors have breached their obligation such that the oppression remedy
should be available, the complainant must first “identify the expectations that he or she claims
have been violated by the conduct at issue and establish that the expectations were reasonably
held”.106 Second, the complainant must show that these reasonable expectations were violated by
corporate conduct that was oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregarded the
interests of “any security holder, creditor, director or officer”.107 The scope of the remedy is broad,
but it must be tailored to remedy only the oppressive conduct. Remedies include orders restraining
conduct, replacing directors, setting aside transactions, and compensating aggrieved persons.108
The oppression remedy seeks to apply a measure of corrective justice, but it should go no further
than necessary to correct the injustice or unfairness.109
In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, debentureholders sought relief under the oppression remedy
provisions of the CBCA on the ground that the increased debt contemplated by the purchase
agreement under a plan of arrangement and “going-private” transaction under corporations
legislation would reduce the value of their bonds.110 The SCC held that the oppression remedy
105
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109 Wilson, supra note 104 at para 27. See also Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd (1995), 23 OR (3d) 481 (CA).
110 BCE, supra note 32 at para 1. The case involved an appeal from BCE and Bell Canada of a decision from the Québec
Court of Appeal that overturned the trial judge's approval of a plan of arrangement that contemplated the purchase of
the shares of BCE Inc by a consortium of purchasers by way of a leveraged buyout. These appeals arose out of an offer
to purchase all shares of BCE Inc, a large telecommunications corporation, by a group headed by the Ontario Teachers
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focuses on harm to the legal and equitable interests of stakeholders affected by oppressive acts of
a corporation or its directors; and the remedy is available to a wide range of stakeholders —
security holders, creditors, directors and officers.111 The SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders
held that, although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may be
appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on
shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders, citing its judgment in Peoples Department
Stores.112 The SCC held that oppression is an equitable remedy; it seeks to ensure fairness and what
is just and equitable, giving the court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal,
but what is fair.113 Thus, a court considering claims for oppression should look at business realities,
not merely narrow legalities. The SCC also held that oppression is fact-specific; and that what is
just and equitable is judged by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and
in regard to the relationships at play; thus, conduct that may be oppressive in one situation may
not be in another.114 The reasonable expectations of these stakeholders are the cornerstones of
the oppression remedy. The SCC held:
As denoted by “reasonable”, the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and
contextual. The actual expectation of a particular stakeholder is not conclusive. In the context
of whether it would be “just and equitable” to grant a remedy, the question is whether the
expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case, the relationships at
issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting claims and
expectations. Particular circumstances give rise to particular expectations. …
Determining whether a particular expectation is reasonable is complicated by the fact that
the interests and expectations of different stakeholders may conflict. The oppression remedy
recognizes that a corporation is an entity that encompasses and affects various individuals
and groups, some of whose interests may conflict with others. Directors or other corporate
actors may make corporate decisions or seek to resolve conflicts in a way that abusively or
unfairly maximizes a particular group's interest at the expense of other stakeholders. The
corporation and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be sure, but
not by treating individual stakeholders unfairly. Fair treatment - the central theme running
through the oppression jurisprudence - is most fundamentally what stakeholders are entitled
to “reasonably expect”.115
The Court held that not every failure to meet a reasonable expectation will give rise to the equitable
considerations that ground actions for oppression; the court must be satisfied that the conduct
falls within the concepts of oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of the claimant's
Pension Plan Board, financed in part by the assumption by Bell Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE, of a $30
billion debt. The plan of arrangement was approved by 97.93% of BCE’s shareholders. The debentureholders alleged
that the arrangement was not “fair and reasonable” and opposed court approval of the arrangement under s. 192 of
the CBCA, supra note 17. The crux of their complaints was that, on the completion of the arrangement, the short-term
trading value of the debentures would decline by an average of 20% and could lose investment grade status.
111 Ibid at para 45.
112 Ibid at para 37.
113 Ibid at para 58.
114 Ibid at para 59.
115 Ibid at paras 62-64.
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interest, within the meaning of the statutory provisions.116 The concepts do not represent
watertight compartments, and often overlap and intermingle.117 Under the unfair prejudice and
unfair disregard branches of the oppression remedy, the focus is on the effect on the injured
complainant of the conduct.118 This approach has been interpreted as conduct that unfairly
disregards the complainant’s interests, conduct that unjustly or without cause fails to pay attention
to, or ignores or treats as of no importance the interests of security holders, creditors, directors or
officers.119 In this aspect of the oppression remedy, there need not be any bad faith or an intention
to harm the complainant.120 The remedy is available to protect a complainant’s legal rights, as well
as reasonable expectations arising out of the course of dealing between the parties or corporate
law itself.121
The court is to conduct two related inquiries in a claim for oppression. First, does the evidence
support the reasonable expectation asserted by the claimant in the specific facts of the case? The
claimant must identify the expectations that have been violated by the conduct at issue and
establish that his or her expectations were reasonably held. Second, does the evidence establish
that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppression”,
“unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a relevant interest?122 While the Supreme Court noted
that it is impossible to catalogue exhaustively situations where a reasonable expectation may arise
due to their fact-specific nature, some generalizations can be made. Actual unlawfulness is not
required to invoke the oppression remedy, as the remedy is focused on concepts of fairness and
equity rather than on legal rights. In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation or
interest to be considered, the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all of the interests
at play; and thus, not all conduct that is harmful to a stakeholder will give rise to a remedy for
oppression.123 The Court held that factors to be considered in determining whether a reasonable
expectation exists include: general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the
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relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant could have taken to protect
itself; representations and agreements; and the fair resolution of conflicting interests between
corporate stakeholders.124
The SCC held that commercial practice plays a significant role in forming the reasonable
expectations of the parties; and that a departure from normal business practices that has the effect
of undermining or frustrating the complainant’s exercise of legal rights will generally, although not
inevitably, give rise to a remedy.125 Courts may accord more latitude to the directors of a small,
closely held corporation to deviate from strict formalities than to the directors of a larger public
company.126 The Court observed that reasonable expectations may emerge from the personal
relationships between the claimant and other corporate actors.127 However, the SCC also noted
that practices and expectations can change over time, and where valid commercial reasons exist
for the change and the change does not undermine the complainant’s rights, there can be no
reasonable expectation that directors will resist a departure from past practice. 128 Given that
knowledge about climate-related financial risk and policy commitments to a low carbon economy
have developed substantially in recent years, directors and officers are clearly able to depart from
their past practice of ignoring climate change risk; they should develop new strategies to address
the risk in the company’s best interests. Reasonable expectations may be affected by
representations made to stakeholders or to the public in promotional material, prospectuses,
offering circulars, and other communications.129
The SCC held that where conflicts among corporate stakeholders involve the interests of the
corporation, “it falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them in accordance with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”130
It observed:
…the duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends
a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly.
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There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all the
circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, having
regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat
affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as
a responsible corporate citizen.131
There is a further inquiry where the remedy sought is an order of personal liability of the directors.
On 13 July 2017, in Wilson v Alharayeri, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reaffirmed that
a corporation’s directors may be personally liable in an oppression action under Canadian
corporate law, clarifying the criteria for imposing personal liability.132 The first of the two-prong
test for personal liability requires that “the director or officer must be implicated in the oppressive
conduct”; the “oppressive conduct must be attributable to the individual director because of his
or her action or inaction”.133 Second, the imposition of personal liability “must be fit in all of the
circumstances”.134
The SCC in Wilson v. Alharayeri held that at least four general principles should guide courts in
fashioning a fit remedy under the CBCA oppression remedy provision.135 First, the oppression
remedy request must, in itself, be a fair way of dealing with the situation.136 Fairness is central to
the inquiry. The Court held that it may be fair to hold a director personally liable where a remedy
against the corporation would unduly prejudice other security holders. While personal benefit and
bad faith are hallmarks of conduct attracting personal liability, as are other indicia, they do not
constitute necessary conditions to imposing personal liability, and they should not overwhelm the
analysis.137 The SCC held that these factors merely represent indicia of fairness. The SCC held that
the fairness principle is ultimately not amenable to formulaic exposition and must be assessed in
light of all the circumstances of a particular case. The second principle is that any order should go
no further than necessary to rectify the oppression.138 Third, any order may serve only to vindicate
the reasonable expectations of security holders, creditors, directors or officers in their capacity as
corporate stakeholders.139 Fourth, a court should consider the general corporate law context in
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exercising its remedial discretion.140 Director liability cannot be a surrogate for other forms of
statutory or common law relief, particularly where such relief may be more fitting in the
circumstances.141
The SCC held that conduct may run afoul of s. 241 CBCA even when it is driven by lesser states of
mental culpability, as a range of conduct can give rise to liability:
“Oppression” carries the sense of conduct that is coercive and abusive, and
suggests bad faith. “Unfair prejudice” may admit of a less culpable state of mind,
that nevertheless has unfair consequences. Finally, “unfair disregard” of interests
extends the remedy to ignoring an interest as being of no importance, contrary to
the stakeholders’ reasonable expectations … 142
The oppression remedy is concerned with the effects of oppressive conduct, not the intent of the
oppressor.143
Applying these standards to conduct in respect of climate change risk, it is the latter two categories
under the oppression remedy provisions that are likely to attract the attention of stakeholders
seeking to hold directors and officers accountable for failure to address climate change risk.
Directors could be held personally liable if they act in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, based
on adverse consequences to equity holders, and in some cases, other stakeholders. An example
could be a decision to continue investing in fossil fuels when directors and officers ought
reasonably to have known that the consequences of depressed market prices and policy changes
means there will be firm failures and growing numbers of stranded assets. “Unfair prejudice” does
not require a culpable state of mind; the court will assess whether the decision or failure to act
had unfair consequences. The third threshold, “unfair disregard” of interests extends the remedy
to where directors have ignored an interest as being of no importance, contrary to the
140
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stakeholders’ reasonable expectations. Directors and officers are arguably at risk of personal
liability if a complainant had a reasonable expectation that they would address climate change risk;
and the directors and officers disregarded their interests. However, their due diligence in
addressing climate risk, as discussed below under “defences”, will protect them from personal
liability.
If the best interests of the corporation are defined in terms of decisions that advance the potential
long-term operational, financial and environmental sustainability of an enterprise, including
climate adaption and mitigation measures, arguably both the public interest and the interests of a
broader number of stakeholders could become factors in shifting current approaches.144 Assessed
on the reasonable expectations of the complainant, the oppression remedy could be utilized to
enforce directors’ obligations to make decisions that are aimed at financial sustainability and
addressing climate or other systemic risks. In particular, judicial reasoning as to what “unfairly
disregards” and is “unfairly prejudicial” under oppression remedy provisions could be informed by
(and inform) “reasonable expectations” regarding the need to address such risks both to ensure
corporate survival and exercise good corporate citizenship.145 Claimants seeking oppression
remedies would have to establish the threshold of whether they come within the definition of
complainant. Once recognized, the court has broad authority within the proceeding to craft a
remedy to address the risk or the harm caused. On the other hand, claimants seeking to assert
that climate mitigation strategies are oppressive because of the effect on immediate returns are
liable to be thwarted by the “reasonable corporate citizen” view of the corporation’s best interests
as the lens through which the reasonableness of expectations will be evaluated.
In reality, climate-related litigation is likely to allege breaches of multiple duties. The SCC in BCE
Inc v 1976 Debentureholders analyzed the relationship between the oppression remedy and
directors’ duties under corporations statutes:
The fact that the conduct of the directors is often at the centre of oppression actions
might seem to suggest that directors are under a direct duty to individual stakeholders
who may be affected by a corporate decision. Directors, acting in the best interests of
the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their decisions on corporate
stakeholders, such as the debentureholders in these appeals. This is what we mean
when we speak of a director being required to act in the best interests of the
corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen. However, the directors owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation, and only to the corporation. People sometimes speak in terms
of directors owing a duty to both the corporation and to stakeholders. Usually this is
harmless, since the reasonable expectations of the stakeholder in a particular outcome
often coincides with what is in the best interests of the corporation. However, cases
(such as these appeals) may arise where these interests do not coincide. In such cases,
it is important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation, not to
stakeholders, and that the reasonable expectation of stakeholders is simply that the
directors act in the best interests of the corporation.146
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i.

Who Can Bring an Oppression Remedy Application?

It is most likely that security holders would bring claims seeking an oppression remedy for allegations
that the directors and officers failed to identify climate-related risk and develop mitigation and
adaptation strategies. They have standing as of right and can more easily establish as reasonable
their expectations that the directors and officers would address threats to the sustainability of the
company and thus to their financial interests. The broad language of the remedy, including that the
directors unfairly disregarded their interests, gives considerable scope for a potential claim.
In respect of potential claims by stakeholders other than security holders, it would be difficult for
non-governmental organizations (“NGO”) to bring a claim for an oppression remedy for two reasons.
The first hurdle is that the claimant must qualify as a “complainant”, as that term is defined in
corporations statutes. Second, the remedy itself only protects the the interests of any security holder,
creditor, director or officer.147 The statutory language creates two classes of potential complainants:
a defined class where the individual falls within one of the relationships with the corporation defined
in the statute, and an undefined class of potential claimants who are, in the court’s opinion, “a proper
person”. Individuals who are not security holders may apply for an oppression remedy by asking a
court to exercise its discretion to recognize them as complainants.
Although the criteria for standing to bring an oppression remedy application do not specify any limits
on who may commence the application, the criteria for those individuals who may obtain a remedy
for unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of their interests appear restricted to members of a defined
class of claimants.148 While the court may determine anyone is a “proper person” to bring an
oppression remedy claim, the remedy provided in the statute is limited to corporate actions that are
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregard the interests of a narrower set of
stakeholders, “any security holder, creditor, director or officer”.149
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The Ontario Divisional Court held that the oppression remedy is designed to address the imbalance
of power on the part of those directors in control with the vulnerability on the part of those
individuals who have a genuine stake in the affairs of the corporation, but no control over its
conduct.150 The oppression remedy gives recognition to the fact that there are a number of classes
of persons who have a legitimate stake in the manner in which the affairs of a business corporation
are conducted. It prevents those individuals having power and control over the affairs of a business
corporation from exercising that power with impunity.151 Adopting the reasoning in BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders, the Court in 1413910 Ontario Inc (cob as Bulls Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v
McLennan held that the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and contextual.152 The
question is whether the expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case,
the relationships at issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting
claims and expectations.153
The current reasonable expectation test used by Canadian courts in determining whether an
oppression remedy should be granted may serve an important gatekeeping function in terms of
the type of actions that give rise to a remedy, hence protecting the diligent director from frivolous
claims. The significance of case law that emphasizes that the reasonable expectation test is an
objective standard is critically important, given the scientific consensus regarding climate change
risk and Canada’s adoption of COP 21 reduction goals.

3. Derivative Action
The derivative action is aimed at enforcing a right of the corporation itself.154 Many Canadian
corporate law statutes utilize the same definition of a proper complainant under derivative action
provisions as that utilized under the oppression remedy provisions. The complainant seeks leave
of the court to bring an action on behalf of the corporation against directors. It is a remedy
designed to hold directors accountable for conduct that harms the corporation itself. A derivative
action can be sought for alleged violations of the statutory fiduciary duty, the duty of care, or under
oppression remedy provisions. The remedy sought must be for the benefit of the corporation as
available in the former situation, but not in the latter. The court will consider whether the interests of the individual as
an employee of the corporation were so closely intertwined with her interests as a shareholder, and whether the
dismissal forms part of a pattern of conduct meant to exclude the individual from participation in the corporation.
150 1413910 Ontario Inc (cob as Bulls Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v McLennan, [2009] OJ No 1828 Ont SCJ Div Ct). In that
case, the Court held that a creditor to whom the corporation owed an obligation affirmed by judgment but not yet
quantified by an assessment of damages, was no less in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the corporation and had no less
of a legitimate stake or interest in the manner in which the affairs of the corporation were conducted than one to
whom a liquidation sum was owed. The Divisional Court held that the trial judge was correct in concluding that the
creditor had a reasonable expectation that funds would be available to it, thus the thwarting of that expectation
constituted oppression. It concluded that the creditor became a creditor when it obtained a summary judgment in its
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a whole. The party seeking status must meet statutorily imposed tests of acting in good faith and
have made reasonable prior efforts to have the directors pursue an action on behalf of the
corporation.155
The derivative action is another possible avenue for shareholders and possibly others to seek a
remedy against directors personally if they can meet the threshold criteria as a complainant and
persuade the court to exercise its discretion to allow the claim to proceed. In addition to giving
notice of the claim to the directors and providing a reasonable period for them to take up the
claim, a complainant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the claim is being
brought in good faith and that it has a reasonable prospect of success, in order to be granted leave
to proceed with the claim.
Creditors, who are not one of the defined classes of complainants, have been granted access to
derivative actions only in very limited circumstances, such as where the creditor has a direct financial
interest or a particular legitimate interest in the manner in which the affairs of the corporation are
being managed.156 The courts have held that a creditor seeking to bring the derivative action must
be in a position somewhat analogous to a minority shareholder, where it has no right to influence
what it sees as abuses by management or conduct contrary to the corporation’s interests.157 If the
court is satisfied of this interest and the creditor meets the other statutory criteria, the court may
exercise its discretion to grant status.158
With respect to potential derivative action claims regarding climate-related risk, directors and
officers will be most vulnerable to claims from shareholders, as they have a direct financial interest
in corporate officers managing these risks. A derivative action is aimed at benefiting the corporation
itself and the entire body of shareholders and others with legitimate interests in how the corporation
is being managed. However, one could anticipate an NGO located in a “one company town” or “one
industry community” in which directors failed to consider climate change risk seeking to commence
a derivative action. The NGO would have to establish a legitimate interest in the corporation’s future
sustainability, such as, that its survival affects the economic security of the community. One-industry
steel and mining towns in Northern Ontario come to mind as an example.
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One benefit for potential complainants is that the court can order that the corporation fund the
litigation where the complainant makes the case that it should fund the derivate action to hold
directors personally liable.159 It can also be a hurdle for getting approval of a derivative action. Where
the court authorizes the derivative action and orders the company to finance the litigation, the
claimant is often not risking its own resources in pursuing the claim against the directors personally.
To this end, the rigorous tests in the statute and the high thresholds set by the court ensure that the
resources of a corporation are not unnecessarily depleted by pursuit of the action, while still allowing
potentially meritorious cases to proceed. An NGO would have to persuade the court that it met this
threshold in order to ground a derivative action.
The court’s approach, therefore, appears to be efficiency and fairness enhancing in that directors
have incentives not to engage in conduct contrary to the interests of the corporation, creditors
cannot inappropriately use corporate resources to pursue litigation, and availability of the remedy
may enhance governance decisions, since institutional shareholders are unlikely to tolerate conduct
by directors that results in corporate resources financing litigation.

4. Materiality
Materiality underpins much of the transparency requirements of Canadian securities law, a
determining factor as to whether information must be disclosed to investors.160 Materiality is also
a tool with which to measure proper exercise of fiduciary obligations. If the risks to the business
are material, whether direct risk to the business through physical risks, transition costs or material
financial risk in terms of market prices, financial performance, etc, directors and officers should
have identified material risk to the best interests of the company. They should have devised a
strategy to address the challenges, and monitored its implementation on a continuing basis,
whether the company is privately held or publicly traded. Non-financial material issues, which may
be important to stakeholders, are also relevant, and directors and officers should be managing
these issues effectively, even if they do not pose a significant threat to the viability of the business.
They need to be able to establish for corporate stakeholders the ongoing steps they are taking.
The probability/magnitude test is a method sometimes used by Canadian securities regulators to
analyze when contingent events become sufficiently crystallized that they are required to be
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For example, s 240 of the CBCA, supra note 17, specifies:
240 In connection with an action brought or intervened in under section 239, the court may at any time make any
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disclosed as material changes.161 It requires an assessment of the probability that an event will
occur, having regard to all the known or ascertainable facts. It also requires some assessment of
the magnitude or significance of the change, in terms of whether the information would be viewed
by reasonable investors as important information for making a decision to buy, sell, or continue to
hold their securities.162 An important question is whether materiality of climate-related financial
risk depends on the existing probability/magnitude assessment,163 or whether it needs to have a
different understanding that recognizes the scale of risk, the longer timelines, and the impact of
failing to act beyond an assessment of financial impact. In some instances, material changes are
contingent or uncertain, although directors and officers of the corporation may have some
information regarding the possibility of such a change. Disclosure relating to corporate governance
is not subject to a materiality standard in Canada; climate-change disclosure should be treated
similarly.
The TCFD has recognized that most information included in financial filings is subject to a
materiality assessment.164 However, it observes that because climate-related risk affects nearly all
industries, many investors believe it requires special attention. For example, the TCFD reports that
in assessing organizations’ financial and operating results, investors want insight into the
governance and risk management context in which such results are achieved.165 It recommends
that organizations provide climate-related financial disclosures in their mainstream public annual
financial filings, noting that in most G20 jurisdictions, public companies have a legal obligation to
disclose material information in their financial filings, including material climate-related
information.166 The TCFD recommends that organizations should describe their processes for
prioritizing climate-related risks, including how materiality determinations are made within their
organizations.167 Essentially, the materiality requirement is that investors and other stakeholders
should be able to see major trends and significant events related to climate change that affect or
have the potential to affect the company’s financial condition and/or its ability to achieve its
business plan or strategy.

5. Is There Really Litigation Risk?
A decade ago, the question would have been, can directors and officers consider climate-related
risk in the exercise of their duties, given its long time horizon? Today, the question has
fundamentally shifted. Can directors and officers ignore climate-related risk in the exercise of their
fiduciary duties and their duty of care? Arguably not.
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Litigation on climate-related risk is most likely to arise in the context of securities disclosure
obligations.168 However, as corporations act through directors and officers, it is their actions that
will determine the liability of the corporation. As Canadian courts determine the scope of the duty
to disclose in relation to climate risk, they may look to how directors and officers have devised
processes to identify material risk, and what programs, processes and strategies they have adopted
to address the risks identified, even where securities law has not been amended to expressly
require directors and officers to identify and disclose climate-related financial risk.
In August 2017, lawyers at Environmental Justice Australia filed a lawsuit on behalf of two
shareholders of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (“CBA”) alleging that the bank’s 2016 directors’
report did not adequately inform investors of climate change risks.169 The Notice of Filing alleges
that CBA knew, or ought to have known, that its climate change business risks might have a
material or major impact on the operations, financial position, and prospects for future financial
years of CBA’s business and its customers; that CBA ought to have had business strategies to
manage CBA’s climate change business risks; and that CBA’s members (shareholders) reasonably
require a summary of CBA’s climate change business risks and of the business strategies, if any,
employed to manage those risks.170 The shareholders argue that such a summary is necessary for
shareholders to make an informed assessment of CBA’s operations, financial position, business
strategies, and prospects for future financial years.171 They are seeking an injunction to stop the
bank making the same omissions in future annual reports.
The action in Australia comes on the heels of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
observing that entities can no longer treat climate change as “non-financial” and that risks
associated with climate change extend far beyond the ecological realm to economic transition risks
that “are actionable now by Australian banks, insurers, asset owners and asset managers”.172 In
addition, a legal opinion released by the Australian Centre for Policy Development and the Future
Business Council states that “company directors who fail to properly consider and disclose
foreseeable climate-related risks to their business could be held personally liable for breaching
their statutory duty of due care and diligence”. 173
These developments suggest that it is only a matter of time before some legal action is taken in
Canada. Directors and officers should therefore be proactive in addressing climate-related risk,
rather than reactive to a lawsuit under corporations law, securities law, environmental law, or the
168
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common law. The previous discussion regarding the scope of fiduciary obligations and the duty of
care has already canvassed some of the defences to actions that may be brought. The short answer
is, if directors and officers are duly diligent in identifying whether there are climate-related risks
and the scope of those risks, and if identified, in developing strategies to address the risk, they are
unlikely to be held personally liable. Such diligence is also likely to help protect the corporation
from losses due to climate-related civil actions. Thus, good governance would suggest directors
and officers act now to meet their obligations.
Another possible source of litigation are the consumer protection statutes in various provinces.
While not a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation, they may be a tool to hold companies
accountable for failing to adequately disclose risks associated with climate change. If a consumer
product being sold by a corporation carries a risk of negative impact on the environment, class
action litigation risk associated with such matters should prompt directors and officers to diligently
investigate their company's compliance and marketing practices. Recently, a Canadian class-action
lawsuit against Volkswagen for its cheating emissions testing received Ontario court approval of a
$2.1 billion settlement plan for the 105,000 purchasers and individuals that leased certain
Volkswagen or Audi vehicles in Canada.174 Similarly, in 2017, Koskie Minsky LLP and Lenczner Slaght
Royce Smith Griffin LLP commenced a class proceeding against Mercedes-Benz Canada Inc,
Daimler AG, and other defendants, alleging that Mercedes BlueTEC vehicles are non-compliant
with Canadian emissions laws, both in emitting significantly higher levels of pollutants than are
permissible and emitting toxic chemicals at much higher levels when the temperature drops below
10°C.175 In both cases, companies are alleged to have sold cars as being “clean and green”, when
in fact their emissions fell far below legal standards. Consumer protection legislation allows for
class members to rescind their contracts and receive a full refund when a product was marketed
by misrepresentation.176 Consumer misrepresentation class actions provide another tool to hold
corporations accountable when the misrepresentations by their officers lead to negative
environmental consequences and reduced utility of the product purchased by consumers.177
Directors and officers have a duty to diligently investigate their company's business and marketing
practices to avoid the litigation risk of such massive consumer fraud/misrepresentation cases.
There are relatively few cases in Canada in which suits are brought against directors for failure to
exercise a duty of care.178 In some measure, it is because Canada has a “cost follows results” regime
that deters individual actions against directors; the plaintiff risks having to pay the legal costs for
the defendant if it loses. However, one could anticipate a coalition of investors or a coalition of
NGO funding an action for breach of the fiduciary obligation or duty of care, even where there are
these potential cost consequences.
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If a complainant pursues an action alleging a breach of fiduciary obligation owed to the corporation
by the directors that had harmed the corporation in some way and thus indirectly harmed its
interests, there would still be barriers to the pursuit of a derivative action. The courts generally
serve a gatekeeping role in determining leave to commence a derivative action. They have
generally been reluctant to order corporations to cover the costs of derivative actions until a
judgment on the merits is obtained, creating a considerable cost barrier to their pursuit.179
The SCC in Peoples Department Stores recognized, for the first time, a “business judgment rule” in
Canada, which serves as a type of defence to particular decisions or conduct of directors and
officers.180 The SCC observed:
Many decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are
reasonable and defensible at the time they are made. Business decisions must sometimes
be made, with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in
which detailed information is not available. It might be tempting for some to see
unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that
becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, Canadian courts
have developed a rule of deference to business decisions called the “business judgment
rule”, adopting the American name for the rule. 181
The SCC subsequently held that the business judgment rule accords deference to a business
decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives. 182 It held that the deference
reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated to manage the corporation's business and
affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation,
including decisions on the appropriate balance among stakeholders' interests, as well as other
directorial decisions.183
With respect to climate-related financial risk, the court would look to see that the directors made
a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. Provided that the decision made, and the action
taken to monitor, mitigate and/or adapt with respect to climate risk is within a range of
reasonableness, the courts will not substitute their opinion for that of the directors, even though
subsequent events may have cast doubt on the directors’ decision. The SCC has held that courts
should defer to business judgments when assessing whether there has been a breach of duty,
although this deference is to duly diligent decisions rather than a presumption of sound business
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judgment as exists in the United States.184
The Ontario Court of Appeal in UPM-Kymmene v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc held that the
business judgment rule “recognizes the autonomy and integrity of a corporation and the expertise
of its directors”, since they are “in the advantageous position of investigating and considering firsthand the circumstances that come before it and are in a far better position than a court to
understand the affairs of the corporation and to guide its operation”.185 However, the court will
not exercise deference unless directors are scrupulous in their deliberations and demonstrate
diligence in arriving at decisions. Courts are entitled to consider the content of the directors’
decision and the extent of the information on which it was based, and to measure these
considerations against the facts as they existed at the time the impugned decision was made.186
Therefore, although corporate board decisions are not subject to microscopic scrutiny with the
perfect vision of hindsight, they are subject to examination.187
Hence, while statutory defences and the recognition of a judicial deference to business judgment
offer directors and officers powerful defences against claims that they breached their statutory
fiduciary duties or their duty of care, courts want to know they have been scrupulously diligent.
While largely a process inquiry, judgments such as UPM-Kymmene v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc
emphasize that courts will consider the content of decisions and the extent of information on
which they are based. While the courts will accord deference to reasonable decision-making and
the business judgment of directors and officers, statutory terms such as due diligence offer
considerable scope to the court for review in cases where corporations have caused considerable
harm either to a third party or a minority entity. Rapidly developing technical and best practice
information on climate-related financial risk allows directors and officers more information on
scale of risk and best practice measures to address that risk. Directors will now need to
demonstrate how they exercised their duties of loyalty and care in respect of climate-related risk
that is reasonably foreseeable.

6. Lessons from Existing Environmental Liability Cases
Directors have been held personally liable for environmental harms in Canada. While there are not
direct lessons for fiduciary obligation in the sense that environmental liability is expressly imposed
by statute and a government agency enforces any breaches, the approach of the courts in
considering personal liability and any available defences may offer some insights in respect of
climate change and director and officer liability risk.
While there appear to be no Canadian judgments expressly addressing climate change,
corporations and their officers have long been held accountable for emissions exceeding statutory
limits. Environmental liability under both statute and common law in Canada is an area in which
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there has been a growth in the responsibility assigned to corporate directors and officers.188 There
are more than 30 statutes in Canada that afford protection to the environment and most, if not
all, impose liability on directors for breach of the statute.189 The purpose of environmental statutes
is to prevent and remedy environmental contamination or harm. These statutes are generally
referred to as “public welfare” legislation, aimed at preventing potentially adverse effects through
the enforcement of minimum standards of care and conduct of corporations and their directors
and officers.190 Directors and officers face potential personal liability under these statutes in
addition to the corporation’s liability. The potential liability varies depending on the type and
severity of the conduct giving rise to the environmental condition or damage. Directors and officers
may face fines and/or terms of imprisonment, and even liability for clean-up costs.191
Environmental protection statutes are aimed at holding corporate officers accountable for actions
of the corporation that are harmful to the environment or that negatively affect the health of
residents. Much of the legislation imposes personal liability on those persons who have charge,
management or control of the corporation’s activities or property.192 Directors and officers may
be considered to have charge, management or control of a corporation if they take an active role
in the business or if they had a duty or opportunity to take preventive or corrective action but
failed to do so.193 A directing or controlling mind can be attributed to more than one director or
officer. “Control” lies not only in the ability to carry out activities, but also the ability or opportunity
to restrain or prevent environmental harm.194 Most of the environmental statutes in Canada
specify that if the corporation commits an offence, any director that authorizes, permits or
acquiesces in the offence commits the same offence.
The statutes impose a strict liability standard.195 Liability can be imposed on both those directors
and officers with day-to-day responsibility and directors who have personal knowledge of the
problem and fail to exercise due diligence to make the site safer.196 In addition to statutory
reference to those individuals with “care, management and control”, environmental protection
legislation, in most provinces and federally, expressly provides for liability of corporate directors
and officers. The standard for establishing liability is generally that directors and officers will be
liable if they directed, authorized, permitted, participated in or acquiesced in the commission of
an offence by the corporation, in most cases specifying personal liability whether the corporation
is prosecuted or convicted of the offence, or not.197 Ontario approaches the issue by imposing a
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duty on directors and officers of a corporation to “take all reasonable care” to prevent the
corporation from committing certain types of offences and providing that directors or officers who
fail to carry out their duty are guilty of an offence.198
Directors and officers, in most cases, have a defence of due diligence available in terms of potential
personal liability. However, in Ontario, directors and officers must prove that they carried out their
duty to take reasonable care to prevent the corporation from committing an offence.199 Directors
are to take all reasonable care by establishing a proper system to prevent commission of the
environmental offence and by taking reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the
system. That includes a system that requires officers to report periodically to the board on the
operation of the system and that ensures that officers are promptly addressing environmental
concerns brought to their attention.200 The degree of reasonable care to be exercised depends on
the circumstances of the case and the precise language of the environmental legislation.201 The
British Columbia Court of Appeal has rejected a director’s contention that the Crown must prove
an additional element - that the director had a wrongful intention in allowing the corporation to
commit the offence.202
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The courts will carefully scrutinize the language of environmental statutes in order to determine
the elements of the offence that the Crown must establish. The legislation is strictly construed
because of the potential for sanctions such as imprisonment. For example, in Ontario, in order to
establish liability for environmental conditions or damage, the Crown must establish that the
accused emitted, caused or permitted the emission of the contaminant into the natural
environment; and that the contaminant caused or was likely to cause the impairment of the quality
of the natural environment, causing injury or damage to plant, property or animal life, causing
harm or discomfort to a person, adversely affecting the health or safety of a person, causing loss
of enjoyment of normal use of property, or interfered with the normal course of business.203
In R v Shell Canada Ltd, the Alberta Provincial Court held that the standard of reasonable care in
assessing the defence of due diligence involves a proportionality test, assessing the risks involved,
potential harm, potential benefit, and whether the level of sophistication of the system and its
continual monitoring are reasonable given the activity sought to be regulated.204 The judgment is
instructive for what is expected of directors and officers in their due diligence efforts. Scrutiny of
their conduct frequently arises either when there has been an event that gives rise to an investigation
and charges, or when the corporation is insolvent, and creditors or others are assessing the value
remaining in corporate assets, given liability for environmental harms or hazards. The courts have
asked the following questions in assessing the due diligence defence:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Did the directors establish a pollution prevention system?
Was there supervision or inspection?
Was there an improvement in business methods?
Did the directors exhort those individuals controlled or influenced?
Did each director ensure that the corporate officers had been instructed to set up
a system, sufficient within the terms and practices of the particular industry, of
ensuring compliance with environmental laws?
Did the directors ensure that the officers of the corporation reported back
periodically to the board of directors on the operation of the system?
Did the directors ensure that the officers had been instructed to report any
substantial non-compliance to the board of directors in a timely manner?
Is there a system of ongoing environmental audit?
Are there remedial and contingent plans for spills?
Are there training programs in place, sufficient authority to act, and other indices
of a proactive environmental policy?205
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Courts have held that directors are responsible for reviewing environmental compliance reports
provided by corporate officers, but are justified in placing reasonable reliance on reports provided to
them by corporate officers, consultants, counsel or other informed parties.206 Directors have an
obligation to substantiate that the officers are promptly addressing environmental concerns brought
to their attention by government agencies or other concerned parties, including shareholders.
Directors should be aware of the standards of their industry and other industries that deal with
similar environmental pollutants or risks. Directors also have an obligation to immediately and
personally react when they have notice that the system has failed.207 “Reasonably foreseeable” is a
factor to be considered in determining due diligence.208
Numerous statutes also allow environmental authorities to issue “preventative” orders to reduce
the risk of or prevent spills; “control” orders to reduce or control emissions and discharges; and
“stop” orders to halt particular practices, such as discharges, if there is imminent danger to human
beings.209 Under most of these statutes, directors, officers and persons who have charge,
management or control can be held liable for non-compliance with the orders. Under Ontario
legislation, directors owe a duty of care for preventing actual environmental contamination.210
Directors and officers face similar liability under statutes aimed at special environmental concerns
in specific industries.211
The availability of a due diligence defence for directors and officers is discussed in the various
judgments in the Bata Industries case. In R v Bata Industries Ltd., the trial judge held that the directors
failed to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting an unlawful
discharge of liquid material waste, contrary to the Ontario Water Resources Act.212 The corporation
206

See for example, Bata Industries, supra note 195.
Ibid.
208 R v Northwood Pulp & Timber Co, [1995] BCJ No 2380 (BCSC); R v Anachemia Solvents Ltd, [1994] OJ No 1201, 14
CELR (NS) 110 (Ont Prov Div); Canadian Pacific, supra note 203.
209 See, for example, Québec Environment Quality Act, c Q-2, ss 25, 31.43, 109.1, 114.1; AEPEA, supra note 192, ss 113114; MEA, supra note 197, s 24; Ontario Pesticides Act, RSO 1990, c P11, s 28. For example, the British Columbia
Environmental Management Act [BCEMA] imposes liability on directors, officers and other persons in possession or
control of polluting substances, allows the ministry to issue orders to take action to reduce risk of spills or escape, and
specifies that if the corporation commits an offence under these provisions, a director, officer or agent who authorized
or acquiesced is also deemed to have committed the offence, BC Environmental Management Act, SBC 2003, c 53
[BCEMA], ss 45, 82, 85, 121.
210 OEPA, supra note 198, ss 91-99, 147(1)(a), 194.
211 See, for example, Alberta Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-7, s 24 for causing or inducing a permit holder
to contravene its provisions; Alberta Gas Resources Preservation Act, RSA 2000, c G-4, s 19; British Columbia
Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2002, c 43, s 41. There is also liability under most legislation regulating the
transportation of dangerous goods or for pesticide use: see, for example, Saskatchewan Dangerous Goods
Transportation Act, SS 1984-85-86, c D-1.2, ss 18, 21; British Columbia Transport of Dangerous Goods Act, RSBC 1996, c
458, ss 6, 19; Ontario Dangerous Goods Transportation Act, RSO 1990, c D1, ss 4, 7; Québec Pesticides Act, RSQ, c P9.3, ss 110, 119; Ontario Pesticides Act, RSO 1990, c P.11, ss 4, 42, 49. Most provinces also have statutes relating to the
quality and management of practices regarding water, air and other natural resources: see, for example, Nova Scotia
Water Resources Protection Act, SNS 2000, c 10; Alberta Water Act, RSA 2000, c W-3, ss 142, 143, 146; Saskatchewan
Clean Air Act, SS 1986-87-88, c C-12.1, s 22(1); New Brunswick Clean Air Act, SNB 1997, c C-5.2.
212 Bata Industries, supra note 195; Ontario Water Resources Act, RSO 1990, c O.40, ss 116(1)-(3). Section 116(1)
specifies that every director or officer of a corporation that engages in activity that may result in the discharge of any
material into any water or shore or bank or any place that may impair the quality of the water contrary to the Act has a
duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such unlawful discharge.
207

37

was convicted, the judge finding that the corporation did not establish proper systems to prevent
the offence and the directors failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the
system they had in place. The Court held that the onus is on the directors to establish due diligence.213
The trial judge imposed a $60,000 fine on the corporation and imposed a probation order with an
additional amount of $60,000 to fund a local toxic waste management program. The individual
directors were fined $12,000 each and the corporation was ordered not to indemnify them in respect
of their fines as a term of the probation order. The fines were subsequently reduced on appeal to
$30,000 for the waste management program and to $6,000 each for the directors. In reducing the
fines, the Ontario Court, General Division held that not enough consideration had been given to the
defendants’ records as responsible citizens and to their remorse. The Court found that it was not a
deliberate contravention of the legislation, but rather, a failure to take action within a reasonable
period of time. Moreover, the corporation had undertaken complete remedial action with respect
to the area damaged and had circulated instructions to all of its related companies worldwide alerting
them to environmental issues.214 However, the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the nonindemnification order.
On further appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Bata Industries case struck out the nonindemnification order on the basis that it contradicted the legislative scheme of the Ontario Business
Corporations Act, which sets out a comprehensive code governing the indemnification of corporate
officers and directors.215 The Court of Appeal held that the authority under the Ontario Provincial
Offences Act to impose additional terms was aimed at deterrence and rehabilitation, allowing a court,
in addition to imposing a fine or term of imprisonment as set out in the statute, to direct a defendant
to comply with conditions in a probation order, in part to prevent similar conduct and to contribute
to rehabilitation.216 Here, however, the indemnification order was improperly aimed at punishment.
The Court also held that its time-limited nature did little to advance the general deterrence objectives
because the corporation could merely wait out the period and then cover the fine.217
A more recent case did not afford directors and officers access to indemnification when the Ontario
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) issued orders to pay the costs of remediation. In Baker et al v
Director, Ministry of the Environment (Northstar), former directors and officers of Northstar
Aerospace Inc and its parent company, Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc, were held personally liable
for contamination at the company’s former manufacturing and processing facility in Cambridge,
Ontario.218 The environmental contamination arose from the migration of trichloroethylene from the
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company’s site to nearby residential properties, which had resulted from the company’s aircraft parts
manufacturing activities from 1981 to 2010.219
In March 2012, the MOE issued a Director’s order that Northstar clean-up the contaminated ground
water and in May 2012, another Director’s order required Northstar to provide more than $10 million
of financial assurance to the MOE within a week. Northstar entered insolvency proceedings under
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) in June 2012 and obtained a stay of the MOE
orders from the court. Northstar sold all its assets except the Cambridge property on 24 August 2012
and became bankrupt on that date. After the sale proceeds were distributed to its creditors, it had
no funds to conduct the remediation. The Ontario Minister of the Environment ordered the MOE to
assume control of remediation of the site. The MOE then issued an order pursuant to the Ontario
Environmental Protection Act (EPA) to Northstar’s former directors and officers as “persons who had
management and control of the undertaking or property”.220 The order sought payment of over $15
million for the remediation work.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that the directors of Northstar were not eligible to
receive an indemnity from the priority charge created to indemnify Northstar directors in that
corporation’s insolvency proceedings.221 The order against the directors was issued following
Northstar’s commencement of CCAA proceedings and after it became clear that Northstar would
have no funds available to pay the remediation costs. The court supervising the CCAA had issued
an order that Northstar would indemnify the directors for any liability they would incur by acting
in that capacity after the CCAA proceeding commenced, except for liability arising from gross
negligence or willful misconduct, and ordered that directors would have the benefit of a charge of
$1.750 million, in priority to the claims of other secured creditors, to pay any such indemnity
claim.222 However, the Court held that the MOE Director’s order was not a claim that qualified for
the indemnity and directors’ charge because it was the result of events that occurred before the
commencement of the CCAA proceeding and thus was not a liability incurred for acting as a
director after the proceeding commenced.223 The Court noted that to allow such a claim against
the directors’ charge would “wrongfully and inequitably” subordinate a secured creditor to the
claims of an unsecured creditor.224 The Court held that if the MOE Director wished to pursue its
environmental claims against the directors, it would have to do so without recourse to the
directors’ charge and that the directors would have to defend these claims without the CCAA
indemnity.
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The former directors appealed the Director’s order requiring them to pay the costs of remediation
to the Environmental Review Tribunal.225 The Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal refused a
request by the directors for a stay pending a determination of the liability issues. It held:
The Tribunal finds that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that danger to human
health and serious risk of impairment to the natural environment would result if the
remediation work were to be interrupted. This is not a situation where an order is issued
to require commencement of a remediation program that might be able to be delayed for
a few months pending the resolution of an appeal. Rather, the Order here was issued to
confirm an ongoing remediation program for an extremely serious contamination problem
affecting hundreds of nearby residents and regional water systems and to ensure that the
program continues until all risk of harm due to the contamination is removed.226
The former directors had been unsuccessful in previous motions seeking an injunction against the
MOE to prevent them from issuing the order once the CCAA stay expired.227 The former directors
also lost their motion for an order that the CCAA court assume jurisdiction over the merits of their
appeal, rather than the Environmental Review Tribunal, arguing both paramountcy and
administrative efficiency.228 The Court rejected these arguments because they relied on the
existence of an on-going CCAA proceeding for their applicability. Here, CCAA proceedings were at
an end and there was no plan of arrangement that might have contained a compromise of claims
against directors in its provisions. The corporation was bankrupt, the MOE order was against its
former directors and there was no operational conflict between federal legislation and provincial
legislation that would require the application of paramountcy.229 The directors and officers
subsequently reached a settlement with the MOE that involved, among other things, the payment
of $4.75 million to the MOE in exchange for the withdrawal of the order.230
The careful attention that the Court pays to the specific requirements under environmental
protection legislation, including the obligations of directors and officers and the availability of
defences, is quite different than advancing a more general fiduciary obligation for directors and
officers to identify and address climate change risk. There may, however, be an interplay between
these various obligations, where the failure to address climate change intersects with emissions or
other statutory violations. When corporations are financially healthy, they indemnify their
directors, but where they are in financial distress and there is no value in the corporation’s assets
to cover the claims, stakeholders may look to the directors and officers personally. The Baker case
illustrates that while the CCAA contains provisions permitting a compromise of claims against
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directors as part of the larger compromise of claims against a corporation in a plan of arrangement,
where the assets are sold and no plan of arrangement is used to distribute the proceeds, the courts
may be reluctant to intervene in claims against the directors personally.
The issue of environmental harm may also give rise to particular claims in tort with respect to third
parties harmed by activities of the corporation, either through actual production processes or by
accidental emissions or other environmental damage. Claims against directors and officers for torts
related to the environment can be brought against directors or officers even where they are acting
within the course of their duties; however, the facts giving rise to the claim in tort must be specifically
pleaded.231 Where properly pleaded, officers can be held liable for tortious conduct even when acting
in the course of their duties.232

7. Due Diligence Defence for Climate Change Related Decisions
The environmental law jurisprudence does assist in thinking about what a due diligence defence
might look like when stakeholders bring personal or derivative actions in respect of climate-related
financial risk. Questions that the courts might pose, could include:
•

Did the directors and officers undertake to identify potential transition risks and
physical risks from climate change and climate change policies?

•

Did the directors and officers develop an ongoing process or program for monitoring
and identifying new climate-related risks, and have mechanisms in place to respond
rapidly to changes in the risk profile?

•

Did the directors and officers establish a program or put appropriate strategies in
place to manage the climate-related risks identified, such as reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, climate mitigation and adaptation?

•

Was there supervision or inspection of employees carrying out emissions related
activities and mitigation or adaptation activities?

•

Did each director ensure that the corporate officers had been instructed to set up a
system, sufficient within the terms and practices of the industry, of ensuring
compliance with the climate risk identification, mitigation and adaptation program?

•

Did the directors ensure that the officers of the corporation reported back periodically
to the board of directors on the operation of the system?
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•

Did the directors ensure that the officers had been instructed to report any substantial
non-compliance to the board of directors in a timely manner?

•

Is there a system of ongoing climate-related risk audit?

•

Are there remedial and contingency plans in place for acute events?

•

Are there training programs in place, sufficient authority to act, and other indicia of
pro-active climate risk identification, mitigation and adaptation program?

The best defence, of course, is proactive governance. There is evidence that an increasing number
of corporate directors and officers are identifying and addressing climate-related financial risk. For
example, Teck Resources Ltd has identified as one of its four primary sustainability goals a focus
on taking “urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”.233 It expressly recognizes that
its “activities consume energy and generate significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.” 234 Its
four pillars of tackling climate change include: setting ambitious targets to reduce its carbon
footprint, which it is working to achieve through innovation, improved efficiency and adoption of
low-carbon technologies; positioning Teck for the low-carbon economy in terms of products;
advocating for climate action, including effective carbon pricing; 235 and adapting to the physical
impacts, increasing the resilience of its operations by incorporating forecasted climate scenarios
into project design and mine closure planning.236
A second example is TransAlta Corporation, a large publicly-traded corporation owning, operating
and managing a diversified portfolio of 69 power generating facilities that use a variety of fuels,
including coal, natural gas, hydro, and wind.237 It is converting coal plants to gas plants to
significantly reduce GHG emissions before 2030.238 In addition to being the largest hydro producer
in Alberta, it is now the largest wind energy producer in Canada.239 Its disclosures reveal that its
goal, in line with a commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, is to reduce its total
233
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GHG emissions in 2021 to 30% below 2015 levels, and 60% below 2015 levels by 2030.240 It is
working towards optimizing its plants to reduce energy consumption and thus GHG emissions. It
seeks to generate offset and renewable energy credits from its renewable energy portfolio and
emissions trading, and participates in carbon pricing structures in California, Alberta, Ontario, and
Australia. It reports annually on climate change strategy, risk, opportunity and emissions database
to the Climate Disclosure Project (“CDP”).241

IV.

Investment Practice, Fiduciary Obligation and Climate Change Risk

Internationally, institutional investors have increased their attention to climate risk
management.242 In Canada, pension funds in particular have begun to engage with companies in
their portfolios in respect of climate risk. Pension funds and other institutional investors will
potentially lose significant value of their investments if they do not act as prudent investors by
recognizing climate change financial risk. The financial services sector in Canada accounts for
approximately 6% of Canada’s gross domestic product,243 and thus these institutional investors can
be a significant force in the move towards a lower carbon economy.
There are duties of both care and loyalty with respect to fiduciary obligation. Where institutional
investors are fiduciaries, they could be held accountable for failing in their obligations if they do
not address the issues discussed above regarding climate-related financial risk. As noted in part I,
a fiduciary’s duties to beneficiaries are twofold: a duty to act prudently and a duty of loyalty. 244 It
is the prudential obligation that necessitates fiduciaries paying attention to climate change risk,
for the same reasons that directors and officers of corporations must. However, as discussed in
this part, the precise duties of pension fund trustees and other investment fiduciaries have their
own unique considerations.

1. The International Context
The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (“UNPRI”) reports that investors’
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence are not a barrier to implementing environmental and social
investment practices, suggesting that the failure to consider long-term environmental and social
goals is a failure of the investor’s fiduciary duty.245 The report identifies several challenges in terms
of financially material, immaterial, and socio-economic and environmental issues that need to be
considered by the fiduciary.246
240
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These ideas have been discussed for more than a decade. A SHARE report in 2005 suggested that
failure to consider climate change could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty “where it is
determined that trustees ought to have had a reasonable expectation that such factors could
influence materially the long-term performance of plan investments”.247 The UNEP Finance
Initiative that same year concluded that integrating environmental, social and governance (“ESG”)
considerations into investment analysis is “clearly permissible and is arguably required”.248
A report issued by UNPRI in 2015, in collaboration with the UN Global Compact, UNEP Finance
Initiative, and Inquiry: Design of a Sustainable Financial System, titled Fiduciary Duty in the 21st
Century, analyzed investment practice and fiduciary obligation in eight countries, including
Canada.249 While the report focused more generally on responsible investment and ESG issue
integration in investment decision-making, it offered insights for thinking about climate change
risk. Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century notes that many asset owners have made commitments to
responsible investment and have introduced codes requiring institutional investors to take account
of ESG issues in their investment decision-making.250 It observes that failing to consider long-term
investment value drivers is a failure of fiduciary duty.251 ESG considerations include climate change.
The report gives an example of a decision not to invest in a high-carbon asset because of financial
concerns. Asset owners may take account of climate risk issues where there is a clear focus on
beneficiaries’ interests. A decision not to invest in coal mines because of risk of stranded assets
can be a decision in the best interests of beneficiaries. Such a decision is likely to be consistent
with fiduciary duties as long as the decision is based on credible assumptions and a robust decisionmaking process, including clear decisions on investment objectives and reviewing outcomes
achieved, and willingness to change if the data change or if it is clear that the decision is causing
significant damage to the beneficiaries’ financial interests.252
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report recommends that fiduciaries need to be able to show
that they have identified and assessed the risks of climate change to companies and to their
investment portfolios. It recommends that fiduciaries show that they have recognized relevant
risks, even if they are sceptics on the issue of climate change; and have analyzed how climate
change might affect investment returns over the short, medium and long-term. They should also
have explicitly managed the risks, and not assumed that the risks are automatically managed by
other risk management strategies. Fiduciaries must demonstrate that they have interrogated and
247
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challenged the individuals or organizations, for example, investment managers and companies, to
ensure that climate change risks are being effectively managed. They must have established
processes that enable them to demonstrate the actions they have taken.253 Integrating climate
considerations will allow investors to make better investment decisions and improve investment
performance consistent with their fiduciary duties, in turn allocating capital towards well-governed
companies and engaging to influence investee companies to allocate capital internally in ways that
address climate change risks. In this way, they will place “investors in a better position to contribute
to the goals of a greener economy and a more sustainable society.”254
Investors can embed concern about climate change in their investment processes by analyzing
risks and opportunities over the longer-term and by encouraging companies to adopt higher
standards and better practices on these issues, all consistent with their fiduciary duties. 255
Investors could also engage with regulators to encourage the adoption of policy measures to
correct market failures and to require companies and investors to internalize externalities, for
example, through the adoption of carbon pricing, as an integral part of their fiduciary duties.256
Examples of this engagement exist in Canada and internationally.257
For example, the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (“bcIMC”) provides
investment management services to British Columbia’s public sector, with $123.6 billion in assets
under management.258 bcIMC invests patient capital for the long term, and it considers assessing
climate-related investment risk to be integral to fulfilling its fiduciary duty.259 It reports: “in
discharging our fiduciary obligation of working in our clients’ best financial interests to generate
returns, bcIMC aims to manage the long-term risks and opportunities that ESG matters present”.260
bcIMC monitors ESG factors, and where it considers appropriate, uses its influence as a
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shareholder to encourage companies to manage and report on risks and enhance governance and
operational practices.261 bcIMC focuses on reporting and disclosure, emissions reduction, resource
efficiency and regulatory preparation.
Climate change is one of three areas of its focus in respect of long-term business challenges. bcIMC
actively seeks to optimize the value of its public equities portfolio over the long term by integrating
ESG factors, including climate change, into investment analysis and decision making.262 Its
investment reporting expressly recognizes that climate change has a wide-scale economic impact,
directly through flooding and other extreme weather events, and indirectly through regulatory
measures to limit GHG emissions. It observes that virtually all sectors are likely to be affected by
climate change.263 It engages in dialogue with companies in which it invests, to encourage them to
disclose relevant data on climate risks, to encourage investment in research and new technologies
to reduce carbon emissions, and to prepare for increased regulatory scrutiny regarding GHG
emissions.264 bcIMC encourages companies to manage climate change risk and be transparent
about their progress.265 In 2016, it engaged with 265 public companies.266 Such engagement
minimizes portfolio risk for its clients, and increases long-term returns.267
In 2016, bcIMC exercised its proxy votes at 2,183 shareholder meetings.268 bcIMC voted in favour
of shareholder proposals at Rio Tinto and Suncor Energy, which called for additional disclosure
relating to the companies’ exposure to climate change risks.269 The proposals received 99.2 % and
98.2% support respectively, largely because the boards of both companies recommended
support.270 In 2016, bcIMC co-filed its first climate-related shareholder proposal with other global
investors representing 5% of the company’s outstanding shares. The proposal called on Anglo
American Plc to report annually on the resiliency of its business model under different climate
scenarios for 2035.271 The proposal, which was passed by shareholders, also asked for emissions
management and low carbon research and development.272
bcIMC actively engages with regulators and industry associations in encouraging policy change.
bcIMC is signatory to the 2014 Global Investor Statement of Climate Change, which asks
governments to bolster policies to influence investment flow towards a climate-resilient economy,
adopt meaningful carbon pricing and promote low-carbon technologies.273
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bcIMC, “ESG Integration”, March 2017, http://www.bcimc.com/publications/pdf/ESGIntegration-Factsheet.pdf at 1.
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264 Ibid at 6.
265 bcIMC, Responsible Investing Newsletter: Climate Change, April 2016, supra note 258 at 1.
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267 Ibid at 2.
268 Ibid.
269 bcIMC, “2016 Responsible Investing Annual Report”, http://www.bcimc.com/ResponsibleInvesting/Reporting.asp
(“bcIMC Report”).
270 Ibid at 9.
271 Ibid at 6. In 2015, it voted in favour of similar proposals at Royal Dutch Shell Plc and BP Plc, both of which passed
with 98% support.
272 Ibid. Anglo’s board supported the proposal; https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpersnews/2016/climate-risk-reporting-proposal-passes.
273 Ibid. In 2016, it participated in nine collaborations on principles for responsible investment.
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2. Canadian Pension Funds as Fiduciaries
Canadian pension fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation to pension beneficiaries to act
prudently in their best interests in making investment decisions regarding fund portfolios. 274
Pension plan trustees’ duties are assessed based on the express language in the pension plan, and
the relevant pension and trust legislation.275 For example, for a defined benefit pension plan, the
objective is to build a life income for the future retiree. Pension plans have an obligation to make
investment decisions that create sustainable pension funds, addressing intergenerational
pressures such as the need to fund pensions in the short to medium term, and the need to look
ahead to future generations of beneficiaries.276
Pension funds, which safeguard the financial security of our aging population, will potentially lose
significant value of their investments if Canada does not shift the existing fossil fuel trajectory of
our economy very soon.277 That includes both decarbonizing efforts and technological
improvement in fossil fuel extraction and production. Pension fund fiduciaries must act in the best
interests of pension fund beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the trust.278 This fiduciary
obligation is eminent in both statutory and common law, requiring positive actions on the part of
the fiduciaries. In determining asset allocation between short-term and long-term investments,
the duty of care precludes short-term investments that prejudice long-term investments, as the
fund must be sustained over the long-term, and thus, trustees must take account of systemic
risks.279 Climate change is one such risk. The duty of impartiality requires trustees and fund
managers to balance intergenerational interests in their investment decisions, in that the time
horizon for older workers is much different than for workers just entering the workforce.280
This part examines two overarching points. Trustees can take climate change into account as a
legitimate investment issue, which may be short or long term or both, because once climate
change becomes material to the investment decision, it is part of trustees’ fiduciary obligation. If
trustees fail to act to address material climate change risk, they are liable for breach of their
fiduciary obligation. Thus, inaction is no longer acceptable, given all the evidence that climate
change risk is material across the entire economy. Second, trustees can take climate change into
account because they have duties as public fiduciaries additional to their financial duty to
beneficiaries. These ideas are examined in turn.
Public statements by several pension funds and their investment managers illustrate how they
consider climate change to be a material financial risk. An example is the Canada Pension Plan
274

Arguably, there are also foundations with an asset pool for which the same arguments can be made with respect to
fiduciary obligation.
275 Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co, [2010] 2 SCR 273 at para 41; Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc, [2009] 2 SCR 678 at para 187.
276 Davis, supra note 13.
277 Sarra, Anthropocene, supra note 69.
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Investment Board (“CPPIB”), an investment management organization that invests the funds of the
Canada Pension Plan on behalf of its 20 million contributors and beneficiaries.281 CPPIB states that
it has a responsibility to take climate change into account in ensuring it is making sound
investments over the long term.282 As a long-term investor, CPPIB reports that it is investing for
multiple generations of beneficiaries, today and well into the future. It is positioning its portfolio
to perform well through the transition to a low-carbon economy. CPPIB states that “as a significant
long-term investor we believe we can have a powerful influence on the companies in which we
invest. We seek to create change from the inside by engaging with numerous Canadian and global
companies that are high emitters of greenhouse gas emissions.”283
CPPIB seeks enhanced disclosure from companies it invests in, and discusses strategies to help
them manage and improve their GHG emissions and practices related to climate change. It has cofiled climate change-related shareholder proposals.284 CPPIB has also developed a crossdepartmental Climate Change Working Group that actively reviews climate change risks and
opportunities, and its strategy is both “bottom-up review of our investment due diligence as it
relates to the consideration of climate change risks and opportunities” and a “top-down
assessment of climate risk across our total portfolio”, including how climate change is positioned
in CPPIB’s overall risk framework.285 CPPIB has endorsed the TCFD recommendations and is
engaging with investee companies on the recommendations. CPPIB views its approach to climate
change as consistent with its mandate to seek to achieve a maximum rate of return.286
i.

Pension Legislation and Fiduciary Obligation

Pensions are provincially regulated in Canada, except for employees in the federal sector, which
are federally regulated. The legislation varies slightly across the country, but in all cases, imposes
a duty of loyalty and a prudential duty. For example, the Ontario Pension Benefits Act specifies “the
administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and
investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with
the property of another person”.287 The administrator of a pension plan must, in its administration
281

Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“CPPIB”), “Who We Are”, http://www.cppib.com/en/who-we-are/ourmandate/. The CPP Investment Board was established by an Act of Parliament in December 1997.
282 CPPIB, “Our approach to climate change”, 2017, http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2017/cppibsapproach-climate-change/. CPPIB, “Addressing climate change for contributors and beneficiaries”,
http://www.cppib.com/media/documents/11141_CPPIB_Climate_Change_FINAL-2.pdf
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid. It co-filed shareholder resolutions on climate risk at Rio Tinto plc and Glencore plc, in collaboration with other
global investors. it is also a signatory of the CDP, a widely adopted global disclosure system for companies to manage
their environmental impacts and for investors to access environmental information for use in their financial decisions.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid. CPPIB: “We have a singular objective: to maximize long-term investment returns without undue risk, taking
into account the factors that may affect the funding of the Canada Pension Plan and its ability to meet its financial
obligations.” http://www.cppib.com/en/who-we-are/our-mandate/.
287 The OPBA, supra note 14, specifies:
22 (1) The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and
investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of
another person.
Special knowledge and skill
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of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund, use all relevant
knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator’s
profession, business or calling, ought to possess.288 An employee or agent of an administrator is
subject to the same obligations.289 With respect to this obligation, care, diligence and skill would
seem to indicate that climate change risk is a necessary consideration for all pension administrators
in Canada, particularly since many pension funds are invested in fossil fuels and other energy assets
at risk.
A 2011 report by Mercer Inc estimated that as much as 10% of a fund’s portfolio risk exposure
within the next 20 years will arise from climate change, technology, regulatory, and other
impacts.290 Important risk factors include: the rate of development and opportunities for
investment into low carbon technologies, the extent to which changes to the physical environment
(2) The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration
and investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of
the administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought to possess.
Member of pension committee, etc.
(3) Subsection (2) applies with necessary modifications to a member of a pension committee or board of trustees that
is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act
of the Legislature for the administration of a pension plan.
Conflict of interest
(4) An administrator or, if the administrator is a pension committee or a board of trustees, a member of the committee
or board that is the administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator’s interest to conflict
with the administrator’s duties and powers in respect of the pension fund.
Employment of agent
(5) Where it is reasonable and prudent in the circumstances so to do, the administrator of a pension plan may employ
one or more agents to carry out any act required to be done in the administration of the pension plan and in the
administration and investment of the pension fund.
Trustee of pension fund
(6) No person other than a prescribed person shall be a trustee of a pension fund.
Responsibility for agent
(7) An administrator of a pension plan who employs an agent shall personally select the agent and be satisfied of the
agent’s suitability to perform the act for which the agent is employed, and the administrator shall carry out such
supervision of the agent as is prudent and reasonable.
Employee or agent
(8) An employee or agent of an administrator is also subject to the standards that apply to the administrator under
subsections (1), (2) and (4).
Benefits of administrator
(9) The administrator of a pension plan is not entitled to any benefit from the pension plan other than pension
benefits, ancillary benefits and a refund of contributions. 2010, c 24, s 7.
Benefits of members of pension committee, etc.
(10) Subsection (9) applies, with necessary modifications, to a member of a pension committee or board of trustees
that is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a board, agency or commission made responsible by an
Act for the administration of a pension plan. 2010, c 24, s 7.
288 OPBA, supra, note 14, s 22(2). Section 22(3) states that: Subsection (2) applies with necessary modifications to a
member of a pension committee or board of trustees that is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a
board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act of the Legislature for the administration of a pension plan.
289 Ibid at s 22(8).
290 Mercer LLC, Carbon Trust and International Finance Corporation, "Climate Change Scenarios - Implications for
Strategic Asset Allocation", February 2011,
http://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmcweb/Files/Climate_Change_Scenarios_Implications_for_Strategic_Asset_All
ocation.pdf at 7.
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will affect investments and the implied cost of carbon. Published four years prior to the COP 21
Paris Agreement, the report noted the unclear global climate policy environment.291 Four years
later, Mercer updated its report, adding risk of resource availability and the impact on investments
of chronic weather patterns, noting that climate change will unequivocally have an impact on
investment returns such that it needs to be regarded as a new return variable.292 Mercer observed
that the two most significant categories of risk introduced by climate change that pension fund
trustees may take into account are the physical risk of destroyed assets or assets with diminished
value and the regulatory risk of stranded assets or assets with diminished value. It reported that
traditional diversification across asset classes is insufficient to mitigate the portfolio risks of climate
change. Rather, diversification must take place across sources of risk, not just traditional asset
classes, including increased allocation to climate positive assets as a potential hedge for risk.293
With the more certain policy direction coming out of the COP21 agreement, Mercer’s
recommendations have become prescient.
The British Columbia Pension Benefits Standards Act (BC PBSA) sets out the fiduciary obligations of
the pension administrator. 294 The administrator stands in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the
291

Ibid at 2.
Mercer LLC, International Finance Corporation and UK Department for International Development, “Investing in a
Time of Climate Change”, April 2015,
http://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/global/investments/mercer-climate-change-report2015.pdf at 14. The report modelled different scenarios: “transformation”, under which climate change mitigation
limits global warming to 2 degrees Celsius; “coordination”, whereby actions are aligned to hold warming to 3 degrees
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climate change under these scenarios, sectors most effected were coal, renewables.
293 Ibid at 2.
294 British Columbia Pension Benefits Standards Act, SBC 2012, c 30, as amended, s 134 [“BCPBSA”], effective
September 30, 2015.
35 (1) The administrator of a pension plan must ensure that the plan and the pension fund are administered in
accordance with this Act, the regulations and the plan documents.
(2) While acting in the capacity of administrator of a pension plan, the administrator stands in a fiduciary capacity in
relation to (a) the members, and (b) others entitled to benefits.
(3) Without limiting subsection (2), the administrator, while acting in the capacity of administrator of a pension plan,
must
(a) act honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of
(i) the members, and (ii) others entitled to benefits, and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise when dealing with the
property of another person.
(4) The administrator of a pension plan, or, if the administrator is a board of trustees, a member of that board, must
not, while acting in the capacity of administrator, knowingly allow his or her interests to conflict with the
administrator's powers and duties in respect of the plan.
(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), an administrator does not knowingly allow the interests of the administrator to
conflict with the administrator's powers and duties in respect of the pension plan merely because the administrator is
or may become entitled to a pension or other benefit under the plan.
(6) In addition to any other responsibilities under this Act, the administrator of a pension plan must
(a) ensure that the plan documents comply with this Act and the regulations,
(b) if the plan is terminated, ensure that the plan is wound up in accordance with this Act and the regulations,
(c) ensure that any agreement respecting the transfer of money or benefits between the plan and any other pension
plan does not contain any provision, relating to a benefit, that a pension plan is prohibited by this Act from containing,
and
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members and others entitled to benefits.295 The administrator must act honestly, in good faith and
in the best interests of the members, and the care, diligence and skill that it must exercise mirrors
that of the Ontario pension legislation.296 Gold and Scotchmer have observed that the BC PBSA’s
reference to “another person” is intended to obligate pension fund fiduciaries not simply to
exercise the degree of prudence that they exercise in conducting their own affairs, but to conduct
themselves in a more objectively justifiable manner that reflects the fiduciary’s obligations to the
beneficiaries of the pension plan.297 Pension fund fiduciaries are to be duly diligent in their decision
making. Kaplan and Frazer suggest that the duty of care requires trustees to use all relevant
knowledge and skill that the plan administrator possesses or, by reason of his or her profession,
business or calling, ought to possess.298
With respect to climate change risk, a relevant provision of the BC PBSA is section 60 on investment
requirements. It specifies that pension plan assets must be invested in a manner that a reasonable
and prudent person would adopt if investing the assets on behalf of a person to whom the investing
person owed a fiduciary duty to make investments without undue risk of loss.299 Assets must be
invested with a reasonable expectation of a return on the investments commensurate with the
risk, having regard to the plan's liabilities.300 Given the long-term nature of a pension plan’s
liabilities, the need to consider the effects of climate change on those risks seems to be necessary
to comply with this provision. Yet even without similar statutory language, the long-term nature of
pension plans requires the plan’s fiduciaries to consider the risks to comply with prudential and
fiduciary obligations.
In Ontario, the Pension Benefits Act has been amended to require pension funds to disclose
information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into
the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated.301 It

(d) perform any other duties the administrator is obligated under the regulations to perform.
(7) If an administrator employs an agent to exercise one or more of the powers or perform one or more of the duties
of the administrator, the administrator must
(a) be satisfied that the agent is qualified to exercise the powers or perform the duties for which the agent is
employed, and
(b) carry out reasonable and prudent supervision of the agent.
295 BCPBSA, ibid, s 35(2).
296 BCPBSA ibid, s 35(3).
297 Murray Gold and Adrian Scotchmer, “Climate Change and the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund Trustees in Canada”,
Report commissioned by SHARE, 1 September 2015 at 8 (“Gold and Scotchmer”).
298 Ari Kaplan and Mitch Frazer, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 322.
299 BCPBSA, supra note 294, s. 60: Investment requirements
60 (1) Investments, including loans, and financial decisions respecting a pension plan must be made
(a) in accordance with this Act and the regulations, and
(b) in the best financial interests of plan members and other persons entitled to benefits under the plan.
(2) Pension plan assets must be invested in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person would adopt if investing
the assets on behalf of a person to whom the investing person owed a fiduciary duty to make investments
(a) without undue risk of loss, and
(b) with a reasonable expectation of a return on the investments commensurate with the risk,
having regard to the plan's liabilities.
300 Ibid.
301 O Reg 235/14, s. 8. Pension Benefits Act, RRO 1990, Reg 909 (“Pension Benefits Act”).
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is a “disclose and explain” approach.302 Pursuant to Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits Act,
the administrator of a pension plan is required to establish a statement of investment policies and
procedures (“SIPP”).303 Effective January 2016, plan administrators are required to file their SIPP
and any amendments with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”).304 FSCO
observes that reporting that ESG factors are incorporated into the plan's broader investment
policies and procedures requires action by the administrator beyond a broad delegation. Some
examples of the actions that administrators could take include: summarizing policies where the
managers incorporate ESG factors into their investment policies; describing how the administrator
incorporates ESG factors as part of the manager search, selection and review process; and
describing how the administrator incorporates ESG in the choice of investment fund
options.305 FSCO has observed that administrators have a fiduciary duty to supervise their
investment managers, including ensuring that the managers are complying with the PBA and with
the SIPP. This supervision requirement extends to the incorporation of ESG factors, where the SIPP
contains them.306
One report suggests that the amendments have been important in stimulating boards of trustees
to explicitly discuss ESG issues and to seek advice on how responsible investment is consistent with
their fiduciary obligation.307 One advance from the current Ontario requirements would be to

40 (1) A statement required under subsection 27 (1) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the records of the
administrator, at least,
(v) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and
procedures for the plan that contains,
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated;
40.1 (1) A statement to a former member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the
records of the administrator, at least,
(s) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and
procedures for the plan that contains,
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated;
40.2 (1) A statement to a retired member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the
records of the administrator, at least,
(r) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and
procedures for the plan that contains,
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated;
78 (3) The statement of investment policies and procedures shall include information as to whether environmental,
social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how
those factors are incorporated.
302 Section 78(1) of Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits Act, ibid. The Statement of Investment Policies and
Procedures (SIPP) must meet the requirements of the federal investment regulations (FIR), as modified in sections 47.8
and 79 of the Regulation: Financial Services Commission for Ontario (FSCO), “Statement of Investment Policies and
Procedures (SIPP)”, http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/legislative/Pages/sipp.aspx#ESG (“SIPP”).
303 Pension Benefits Act, supra note 301.
304 Ibid.
305 SIPP, supra note 302.
306 Ibid.
307 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 243 at 15. See also FSCO, ibid, which reports that Ontario is saving
approximately $4.4 billion annually in health, environmental and financial costs since it eliminated coal-fired energy

52

require pension plans across Canada to incorporate ESG factors, including climate change risk, into
the plan’s investment policies and procedures. Failure to do so would then give rise to liability for
breach of fiduciary and prudential obligations.
In Manitoba, the Pension Benefits Act expressly allows “non-financial” factors to be taken into
account so long as investment policy and decision making remain consistent with prudence
standards.308 The administrator of a pension plan must exercise the care, diligence and skill in the
administration of the plan and the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise
in dealing with the property of another person.309 Pursuant to the Manitoba Pension Benefits Act,
the administrator is to invest and manage the assets of the pension fund in a manner that a
reasonable and prudent person would apply in investing and managing a portfolio of investments
of a pension fund. Unless a pension plan otherwise provides, an administrator who uses a nonfinancial criterion must have regard for the prudential and diligence standard.310

generation. Ontario Government Green Ontario Fund, “Climate Changes Everything”, 2017,
https://www.ontario.ca/page/climate-change.
308 Manitoba The Pension Benefits Act CCSM c P32, as amended.
Care, diligence and skill
28.1(2) The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration of the plan
and the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another
person.
Investing pension assets
28.1(2.1) The administrator of a pension plan shall invest the assets of the pension fund, and manage those
investments, in accordance with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person would apply in
investing and managing a portfolio of investments of a pension fund.
Non-financial considerations
28.1(2.2) Unless a pension plan otherwise provides, an administrator who uses a non-financial criterion to formulate
an investment policy or to make an investment decision does not thereby commit a breach of trust or contravene this
Act if, in formulating the policy or making the decision, he or she has complied with subsections (2) and (2.1).
Special knowledge and skill
28.1(3) The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the plan and in the administration and
investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the
administrator's profession, business or calling, ought to possess.
Application of subsection (3)
28.1(4) Subsection (3) applies with necessary modifications to a member of a board, agency or commission made
responsible by an Act of the legislature for the administration of a pension plan.
Conflict of interest
28.1(5) An administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator's interest to conflict with the
administrator's duties and powers in respect of the plan and the pension fund…
Employment of agent
28.1(6) Where it is reasonable and prudent in the circumstances so to do, the administrator of a pension plan may
employ or appoint one or more agents to carry out any act required to be done in the administration of the plan and in
the administration and investment of the pension fund.
Employee or agent
28.1(8) An employee or agent of an administrator is also subject to the standards that apply to the administrator under
subsections (2), (2.1), (3) and (5).
309 Ibid, s 28.1(2.2).
310 Manitoba The Pension Benefits Act, supra note 308, s 28.1(2.2).
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ii.

Trustee Legislation and Fiduciary Obligation

Pension fiduciaries must also comply with trustee legislation, which is complementary to their
obligations under pension standards legislation. The Ontario Trustee Act requires that “in investing
trust property, a trustee must exercise the care, skill, diligence and judgment that a prudent
investor would exercise in making investments.311 A trustee may invest trust property in any form
of property in which a prudent investor might invest.312 A trustee must consider the following
criteria in planning the investment of trust property, in addition to any others that are relevant to
the circumstances: general economic conditions; the possible effect of inflation or deflation; the
expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies; the role that each investment or
course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio; the expected total return from income and
the appreciation of capital; needs for liquidity, regularity of income and preservation or
appreciation of capital; and an asset’s special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes
of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.313 Trustees are to diversify the investment of
trust property to an extent that is appropriate to the requirements of the trust and general
economic and investment market conditions.314
Other Canadian trustee statutes contain similar language, although not always as detailed as the
Ontario legislation.315 There is protection from personal liability; specifically, a trustee is not liable
for a loss to the trust arising from the investment of trust property if his or her conduct conformed
to a plan or strategy for investment of the trust property, comprising reasonable assessments of
risk and return, that a prudent investor would adopt under comparable circumstances.316 Trustees
can delegate to agents.317 Manitoba’s trustee legislation has a section on trustee duties similar to
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Trustee Act RSO 1990, c T 23, as amended, s 27(1) (“Ontario Trustee Act”).
Ibid, s 27(2).
313 Ibid, s 27(5).
314 Ibid, s 27(6).
315 See for example, Trustee Act, RSBC 1996, c 464, as amended [“BC Trustee Act”], s 15.2. 15.2. In investing trust
property, a trustee must exercise the care, skill, diligence and judgment that a prudent investor would exercise in
making investments. See also Manitoba The Trustee Act, CCSM c T160, s 68(2).
316 Ontario Trustee Act, supra note 311, s 28; BC Trustee Act, ibid, s 15.3.
317 Ontario Trustee Act, ibid, s 27.1. See also: BC Trustee Act, ibid, s 15.3.
Delegation of authority with respect to investment
15.5 (1) In this section, "agent" means any person to whom a trustee delegates investment responsibility.
(2) A trustee may delegate to an agent the degree of authority with respect to the investment of trust property that a
prudent investor might delegate in accordance with ordinary business practice.
(3) A trustee who delegates authority under subsection (2) must determine the investment objectives for the trust and
exercise prudence in
(a) selecting an agent,
(b) establishing the terms and limits of the authority delegated,
(c) acquainting the agent with the investment objectives, and
(d) monitoring the performance of the agent to ensure compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(4) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with
the terms of the delegation.
(5) A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (3) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for
the decisions or actions of the agents to whom the function was delegated.
(6) This section does not authorize a trustee to delegate authority under circumstances in which the trust requires the
trustee to act personally.
312
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wording of the province’s pension benefits legislation that predates the pension provisions on
prudence, judgment and care in administering the property of others.318
The Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE) suggests that trustee decisionmaking should be aimed at protecting the long-term interests of investors, working people,
communities and society, which in turn will help improve outcomes for pension plan members and
other beneficiaries of trusts.319 This objective is perfectly aligned with the statutory obligations
under both pension and trustee law.

iii.

A Deeper Understanding of Cowan v Scargill

The 1984 English judgment Cowan v Scargill 320 is often cited in Canada as limiting the scope of
conduct of pension fiduciaries.321 Yet a careful reading of the judgment reveals that it is entirely
compatible with pension fiduciaries having an obligation to address climate-related financial risk
in exercising their fiduciary duties. Given the significance of the judgment in Canada and other
jurisdictions, it is worth examining in some detail.
Cowan v Scargill was a case in which five union-appointed trustees on the committee of
management of the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme objected to funds being invested in energy
sources in competition with coal, in overseas investments and in the acquisition of land
overseas.322 The objections were based both on the beneficiaries’ best interests and on “matters
of principle” determined at the union’s annual policy conference.323 The issue was whether the
trustees were in breach of their fiduciary obligations in refusing approval of an investment plan
unless it was amended to prohibit any increase in overseas investment and investment in energies
in direct competition with coal, and provided for the withdrawal of existing overseas
investments.324 The Court held that the starting point was that trustees are to exercise their powers
in the best interests of present and future beneficiaries, holding the scales impartially between
different classes of beneficiaries.325 They must obey the law, but subject to that, put the interests
of their beneficiaries first.326 Megarry V C held that trustees must exercise their power to invest so
(7) Investment in an investment fund referred to in section 15.1 (1) or a common trust fund referred to in section 15.1
(3) is not a delegation of authority with respect to the investment of trust property.
318 Manitoba The Trustee Act, supra note 315, specifies: s 68(2) Subject to any express provision of the will or other
instrument creating the trust, in investing money for the benefit of another person, a trustee shall exercise the
judgment and care that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering the property
of others.
319 SHARE Annual Report, https://share.ca/?s=annual+report.
320 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, [1984] 3 WLR 501, [1984] 2 All ER 750, [1984] ICR 646, [1984] IRLR 260, 128 SJ 550
[Cowan v Scargill, hereafter cited to Ch 270].
321 See, for example, Boe v Alexander, 1987 CanLII 2596 (BC CA); Bathgate v National Hockey League Pension Society,
1994 CanLII 1427 (ON CA)
322 Cowan v Scargill, supra note 320, at 276. The trustees were union-nominated trustees; the other five trustees were
nominated by the National Coal Board.
323 Ibid at 270.
324 Ibid at 276-277, 279.
325 Ibid at 286.
326 Ibid at 287.
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as to yield the best return for beneficiaries, judged in relation to risks, and, in judging potential
return from yield of income and capital appreciation.327 He observed that if trustees decided not
to make a particular investment for social or political reasons and the investment made was equally
beneficial to the beneficiaries, it would be difficult to criticize the decision; but where it is less
beneficial, trustees would normally be open to criticism.328 Trustees are not to refrain from making
decisions that will benefit the beneficiaries because of the views they hold.
Megarry V C said that trustees might even have to act dishonourably, although not illegally, if the
interests of beneficiaries required it, the judge giving a contract law example where trustees may
be bound to consider a better price or offer, essentially an “efficient breach” of an agreement.
Perhaps the language of the judgment in its use of “acting dishonourably” and “gazumping”
(thwarting) a counterparty was unfortunate, but the judge was simply referring to the efficient
contract formation issue.329
Megarry V C also made clear in his reasons that trustees do not need to make financial benefit
their paramount concern, even if the only object of the trust is to provide financial benefits, as
benefit has a wide meaning. He observed that beneficiaries might well consider that it is better to
receive less money from investments where they are not morally or socially opposed to the
investment.330 In such decisions, there is a heavy burden on trustees to determine that it is for the
benefit of beneficiaries as a whole to receive less, and to act with a degree of prudence on the
facts, and such was not the specific case before the court.331 Trustees are to act with care,
prudence and reasonableness in providing the greatest financial benefits for present and future
beneficiaries, including seeking advice on making investments and making decisions on that advice
with prudence.332 Trustees also have a duty to consider the need for diversification of investments
in the circumstances, including considering the size of the trust fund, and the degree of
diversification that is practicable and desirable.333 The Court’s concerns on the facts were that: the
trustees were advocating their position more for future beneficiaries than current ones; the
trustees felt constrained to comply with union policy; and the prohibitions were too sweeping,
when one could not predict the future potential benefits of discarding the disputed investments
in the diversified portfolio.334
Megarry V C found that the defendant trustees had breached their duty to act with prudence and
in the best interests of their beneficiaries when they hindered normal operation of the pension
scheme by insisting on prohibitions that could not be justified as being in the interests of the
beneficiaries.335 The Court declined to make specific orders as it hoped that by giving direction to
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the trustees on their duties, it would get the trust back on “its rails”, but remained seized in case
an order was needed.336
The detailed recitation of the court’s reasoning in Cowan v Scargill is necessary to understand the
full judgment, in order to challenge the argument that trustees cannot make investment decisions
based on social or political grounds and thus cannot address climate change. In fact, the judgment
in its entirely suggests the opposite. Given today’s mounting evidence of the financial, health and
other risks of climate change, today, pension trustees and other fiduciaries could be found in
breach of their fiduciary obligations if they do not take into account the risks. Arguably, some of
the current investments in fossil fuels are weighted in favour of current beneficiaries and not all
beneficiaries because the huge financial risks only 15 years out must be considered. The judgment
indicates that in fulfilling their fiduciary obligation, pension fiduciaries need to consider how their
decisions impact on risk and return to the pension fund, and ultimately beneficiaries, in terms of
the expected shifts to low carbon technologies, the risk of stranded assets, and diminished returns
from companies failing or market prices plummeting.
Unusually, Megarry V C wrote an article commenting on his own judgment several years later,
observing that the case was limited in its precedential value, and noting that the defendant Scargill
did not have a lawyer speak for him in the court room.337 He wrote that one could not say what
would have emerged had the defendant's case been presented by a lawyer. He also wrote that
“Another important factor is the narrow compass of the point that lay for decision. What was in
issue was a matter not of preferences or policies but of exclusion.”338 It was the proposed absolute
prohibition on certain types of investment, without any assessment of whether it was in the
interests of the beneficiaries, that was rejected by the court. “The trustees cannot prefer their own
interests – be they protectionist or otherwise, where those interests are not shared by the
beneficiaries and are detrimental to those beneficiaries’ financial interests”.339 Megarry also
observed that many of the investments regarding which there are social, political or other nonfinancial objections are open to valid objections purely on investment grounds, such as fears for
the political stability of the country concerned.340 He wrote that much may be achieved by trustees
exercising their discretion on perfectly proper grounds without subjecting themselves to any
absolute prohibitions or, indeed, any policy of preference.341 These observations are directly
relevant to pension fiduciaries’ consideration of climate change risk.
The UNEP Finance Initiative report on fiduciary responsibilities suggests that the Cowan v Scargill
decision stands for the “uncontroversial position that trustees must act for the proper purpose of
the trust, and not for extraneous purposes.”342 It observed that all factors relevant to risk and
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return should be considered by fiduciaries in investment decisions, and it may be a breach of
fiduciary duties not to take into account ESG considerations that are relevant, and to give them
appropriate weight, bearing in mind that some important economic analysts and leading financial
institutions are satisfied that a strong link between good ESG performance and good financial
performance exists.343 Climate change risk involves both material financial and non-financial risks,
both relevant to fiduciaries.

iv.

Does the Fiduciary Obligation Differ for Defined Contribution Pension Plans?

Although about 85% of assets under management in Canadian pension funds continue to be held
by defined benefit pension plans, there has been a recent shift from defined benefit plans to
defined contribution pension plans (“DCPP”).344 This shift raises another set of challenges for
fiduciary obligation. Unlike defined benefit plans, in which fiduciary obligation is based on both
statutory and trust obligations, defined contribution plans are contractually based. Nonetheless,
pension legislation in Canada does impose fiduciary and prudential obligations on trustees of DCPP
and their agents. The challenge arises because of the myriad ways in which such funds are
invested.
For example, some DCPP offer beneficiaries a range of options of where to invest their money. If
the employer chooses the options, they should be suitable to providing investment income for a
pension. If the employee chooses the option, the employer’s obligation is to provide beneficiaries
with sufficient information about the risks and benefits of each option so that the employee can
make an informed choice. The policy objective of such plans is to build a life income for the
workforce, although time horizons differ for the beneficiary who is three years from retirement
than for the employee who is 20 years from retirement. If the DCPP includes an option that is not
suitable to that objective, the administrator, and arguably the pension plan trustees, can be liable
for a breach of fiduciary obligations. In terms of climate change risk, the question is what is “not
suitable”. Here the courts will engage in an inquiry about what steps the fiduciaries took to apprise
themselves of the risks to sustainability of the companies within each investment option, which
includes risk of stranded assets, financial risks due to carbon transition, and other climate risks.
While jurisprudence is sparse in Canada, these issues are being litigated in the US courts.345
Three recent judgments are illustrative. The US Supreme Court decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v
Dudenhoeffer centred on Bancorp’s defined-contribution retirement savings plan, where plan
participants may direct their contributions into any of several investment options, including an
“employee stock ownership plan” that invested primarily in the company’s own stock.346 When
Bancorp’s stock fell, the plan participants sued. They claimed the plan fiduciaries should have
known Bancorp’s stock price was too high and excessively risky. The fiduciaries defended on the
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basis that fiduciaries of the employee stock-ownership plan were subject to a relaxed duty of
prudence compared with pension plan fiduciaries generally. The Court disagreed, unanimously
holding that the fiduciaries were subject to the same duty of prudence as pension fiduciaries
generally, except they didn’t have an obligation to diversify assets.347
In Pfeil v State Street Bank and Trust Co, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that control by plan
participants over the allocation of pension assets across a range of investment options does not
exempt fiduciaries from their duty to use prudence when designating and monitoring the menu of
different investment options that are offered.348 In Harris v. Amgen Inc, the US Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff beneficiaries had “sufficiently alleged” that defendants had violated
the duty of loyalty and care they owe as fiduciaries under pension legislation by failing to provide
material information to plan participants about investment in a common stock fund.349 The Court
held that the task of selecting information to include in summary plan descriptions to plan
participants is performed in their fiduciary capacities and is a fiduciary communication to plan
participants. Whether the fiduciary states information in the summary itself or incorporates by
reference another document containing that information is of no moment, it all falls within the
ambit of fiduciary obligation.350
These US judgments make clear that DCPP still give rise to fiduciary duties. Thus, the same
reasoning as discussed above for defined benefit pension plans and fiduciary obligation arguably
apply to DCPP and could ground complaints that the plan administrators failed to address climaterelated financial risk in developing the menu of investment options offered to members of the
plan.
DCPP can also, however, choose to invest through an insurance company, in which case, the
counterparties to the contract are the DCPP and the insurance company. The issue with respect
to the investment strategy is what obligations arise from the contract and to whom. Another issue
is whether the beneficiaries can directly make a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation against the
investment manager of the insurance company for failure to take account of climate change risk
in their investment choices, because ultimately, they are the parties harmed by the risks. The
caselaw in this respect is still under development.
One could argue that the pension fiduciary’s duty even includes trying to cause the investee
corporation to further the non-financial interests of the beneficiaries, where doing so does not
demonstrably harm their financial interests. In respect of addressing climate change risk, arguably,
it will benefit both the financial and non-financial interests.
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v.

Shifting Focus

While Canadian statutory reform has yet to move in the direction of requiring all investment funds
to identify and address climate-related financial risk, efforts by institutional investors elsewhere
provide insights on how a shift could occur.
For example, in 2016, ABP, the large Dutch pension fund, launched a program to invest sustainably.
One objective is to reduce the carbon dioxide (“CO2”) footprint in its equity portfolio by 25% by
2020 compared to the start of 2015.351 By the end of 2016, a reduction of 16% had been realized,
largely from the disposal of most of the fossil branches of the energy companies RWE and E-on
and from new “carbon budgets” that will gradually be reduced each year. ABP has committed to
investing EUR 5 billion in renewable energy by 2020. In 2016, its investments in renewable energy
rose by 25% to EUR 2.8 billion; and in 2016, the company achieved a total return of 9.5% on that
investment.352 ABP has set itself the objective of doubling the investments that contribute to
solving social challenges and environmental problems, from EUR 29 billion at the start of 2015 to
EUR 58 billion by 2020. At the end of 2016, these investments stood at EUR 41 billion.353 ABP
pursues dialogue with companies about climate measures and good corporate governance. In
2016, ABP held discussions with 245 companies and voted at more than 4,000 shareholder
meetings, encouraging companies to become more sustainable.354 In 2016, ABP also developed a
system so that equity investors can see the precise size of a portfolio’s CO2 footprint, to be
implemented fully over the next three years.355
Another example is the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) Board of
Administration, which in May 2014 adopted a set of 11 “Pension Beliefs” that articulate the
pension fund’s views on public pension design, funding and administration.356 Important for this
discussion are the beliefs that “retirement system decisions must give precedence to the fiduciary
duty owed to members but should also consider the interests of other stakeholders”; “funding
policies should be applied in a fair, consistent manner, accommodate investment return
fluctuations and support rate stability”; and “trustees, administrators and all other fiduciaries are
accountable for their actions, and must transparently perform their duties to the highest ethical
standards”. In 2013, CalPERS also adopted ten “Investment Beliefs” to provide a basis for strategic
management of the investment portfolio, to inform organizational priorities, and to guide
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decisions that often require balancing multiple, inter-related decision factors. 357 Of note is
Investment Belief 9, which acknowledges the need for a broad set of investment and actuarial risk
measures and clear processes for managing risk; specifying that as a long-term investor, CalPERS
must consider risk factors such as climate change, that emerge slowly over long time periods, but
could have a material impact on company or portfolio returns.358
The SCC has held that fiduciary law protects vulnerable beneficiaries from abuses of power by
those individuals who owe them a fiduciary duty of loyalty, but also reinforces the social
institutions in which those fiduciaries operate.359 Pension trustees and other fiduciaries should not
shirk responsibilities in terms of thinking about climate change risk in respect of their investment
portfolios. Where they do not possess the requisite knowledge and skill, they have an obligation
to seek expert advice, and then engage in an informed decision process.
Gold and Scotchmer observe that pension standards legislation in Canada maintains an investment
focus on risk and return in a diversified portfolio that is constructed in beneficiaries’ best financial
interests and with specific regard to the liability characteristics of the particular plan.360 In some
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jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, pension benefits standards reflect some of the underlying
objectives and concerns of modern portfolio theory, which they suggest is strong direction to
configure an investment portfolio with regard to the specific characteristics of the plan’s liabilities,
and being concerned with asset/liability matching.361 They also observe that pension fiduciaries
are challenged by the global scale of climate change.
In summary, pension and other fiduciaries must address the full range of considerations relevant
to both risk and return. Pension fund fiduciaries must make their investment strategy decisions
based on a time frame commensurate with the pension plan’s liabilities.362 While there is always
a risk of loss, trustees are to make decisions in a manner that avoids undue loss. Prudential
obligations require the fiduciary to undertake a careful and thorough evaluation of climate change
risk prior to making decisions, and to act on information generated by that process, including a
rationale for their decisions. Materiality is important in assessing the likelihood of the risk
materializing and the downside financial risk if it does. Pension trustees and other fiduciaries must
evaluate the market and regulatory risks that are likely to depress market prices or restrain fossil
fuel production and consumption, adjusting their investment strategies appropriately.363 A pension
fund trustee’s fiduciary duty is to provide oversight of those fiduciaries making investment
decisions, with the objective of trying to ensure that there are funds to pay the promised pension
benefits owing to members currently and in the future. Pension fund trustees’ fiduciary duty
requires them to take into account any risks, within their portfolios, of climate change, as well as
investment opportunities. Non-financial risks are ultimately financial risks, so these factors must
be taken into account.
How can it be done? A number of initiatives address this question. The TCFD has developed
voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for use by companies in providing
information to investors, lenders, insurers, and other stakeholders. It also contains
recommendations for improving investors’ ability to appropriately assess and price climate-related
risk and opportunities. A work in progress, it considers the physical, liability and transition risks
associated with climate change and what constitutes effective financial disclosures across
industries. One of its goals is to “help companies understand what financial markets want from
disclosure in order to measure and respond to climate change risks, and encourage firms to align
their disclosures with investors’ needs.”364 The TCFD concluded that assessing climate change risk
is complex, partly because there are no uniform risk assessment tools or disclosure standards, and
investment strategy must be cognizant of long duration liabilities, often for 70 years or more. For most open defined
benefit plans, young employees are becoming new plan members as the employer’s labour force is renewed;
accordingly, pension liabilities for most open plans may be expected to remain longer term indefinitely.”
361 Ibid.
362 Davis, supra note 13.
363 Damian Carrington and Caelainn Barr, “Coal crash: how pension funds face huge risk from climate change” The
Guardian, 15 June 2015, www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/15/coal-crash-how-pension-funds-face-hugerisk-from-climate-change. UNEP FI, “Portfolio Carbon – Measuring, disclosing and managing the carbon intensity of
investments and investment portfolios”, UNEP FI Investor Briefing, A document of the UNEP FI Climate Change Advisory
Group and Investment Commission (July 2013),
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/UNEP_FI_Investor_Briefing_Portfolio_Carbon.pdf at 3.
76 Ibid at 4-8.
364 Financial Stability Board, Introduction to the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, https://www.fsbtcfd.org/about/#.

62

because the interaction of climate science, financial markets, and regulatory frameworks is
complex in determining downside risks of particular strategies.365 However, there is global
consensus in the scientific community that there is an urgent need for mitigation and adaptation,
which can be guideposts for fiduciaries.
In June 2017, the TCFD released three key documents that serve as building blocks to describe and
support implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations: Final Report: Recommendations of
the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures”; “Annex: Implementing the
Recommendations of the TCFD”, which provides detail to help companies implement the
recommendations and is a “living” document that will be refined as companies gain more
experience preparing climate-related financial disclosures; and “Technical Supplement: The Use of
Scenario Analysis in Disclosure of Climate-Related Risks and Opportunities”, which provides a
further level of detail that can be helpful for companies in considering scenario analysis.366 Scenario
analysis can be very helpful to fiduciaries in determining climate-related financial risk and
strategies to respond. It can also assist in identifying upside investment opportunities in developing
technologies for climate adaptation.

3. Investors, Good Governance and Fiduciary Obligation
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, have an important role to play in facilitating an
overall strategy towards long-term sustainability. To date, business enterprises have externalized
the negative environmental effects of their economic activities because of pressure to exhibit
increased short-term returns to capital market funders. Institutional investors have the economic
power to help businesses shift trajectory. The Bank of Canada reports that the eight largest
Canadian public pension funds are major investors domestically and globally, with net assets under
management of more than $1 trillion. Thus, they can influence how quickly strategies to address
climate change could be integrated into decision making. Globally, investors are increasingly
moving to hold directors to account for their failure to address climate risk.
Canada can learn from international developments. For example, in 2015, the French National
Assembly enacted La Loi de transition énergetique pour la croissance verte (the Law for Energy
Transition and Green Growth), aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, capping fossil fuel
production and increasing renewable energy usage.367 Article 173 of the Law strengthens
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mandatory climate disclosure requirements for listed companies and financial institutions, and
introduces the first mandatory requirements for institutional investors. Listed companies must
disclose annually the “financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s
measures to reduce them”, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every
component of their activities, and disclosing “the consequences on climate change of the
company’s activities and of the use of goods and services it produces”. Institutional investors,
including mutual funds and pension funds,368 must disclose how their investment decision-making
takes social, environmental and governance criteria into consideration, and disclose how they are
contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global warming.369 The law is an
important step forward in addressing climate financial risk, both in the extensive reporting
required and the obligation to disclose the manner in which climate change issues are being
addressed.
The new provision survived a constitutional challenge. The entities subject to Article 173 were
required to publish their ESG criteria by June 2017 for the 2016 financial year.370 The Assemblée
nationale published a report on implementation of the provision,371 including how Caisse des
Dépôts has taken steps to reduce its carbon footprint by 20% per thousand invested over the
period 2014-2020, valued at approximately €55 billion.372 The Climate Disclosure Standards Board
observes that the French law has been important in requiring investors to report on how their
policies and targets align with national energy and ecological targets; and that Article 173 includes
a focus on integration, where companies must disclose information in their mainstream reports,
creating a much stronger connection between climate and other corporate information.373
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The Forum Pour L’Investissement Responsable has observed that France’s move to regulating
based on the “comply or explain” principle is an innovative means to encourage investors and
companies toward best practices aligned with the COP 21 Paris Agreement goals; and that Article
173 will direct financing toward companies that have a low carbon footprint. “It recognizes the key
role investors play in the energy transition, acknowledging the financial aspect of the fight against
climate change.”374 It observes that the new regulations and metrics being developed will provide
solutions to the challenge of translating climate issues into the language of finance, investors
distinguishing between the negative impacts of climate change financial risks and the positive
impacts of energy transition opportunities, growth momentum, and activities that contribute to
the 2°C target.375
The first reports under article 173 reveal some unevenness in the initial disclosure, some reporting
reductions in carbon output by asset class,376 others reporting on green investments and emissions
avoided,377 and some reporting only that these issues will be addressed going forward.378 One
report outlines the climate change risks to which the fund is exposed through the financial assets
that it holds, developing a strategy that will enable it to continually assess its carbon footprint in
terms of both emissions and stock holdings, its physical risks, transition risks, its portfolio’s
alignment with a 2°C scenario, as well as opportunities linked to ecological and energy transition.379
It describes its methodology for meeting its climate trajectory and the limitations of that
methodology.380
It will likely take some time for the reports to develop some consistency in their disclosures
pursuant to article 173. However, what is evident in all the reporting is that it has focused the
attention of pension funds and other institutional investors on climate change and required them
to embed disclosure of climate-related financial and transition risks directly in their reporting. It
will be interesting to monitor over the next period the extent to which they comply with the second
part of the article, disclosing how they are contributing to the energy and ecological transition to
limit global warming.
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379 See for example, Fonds de reserve pour les retraites (“FRR”), “The FRR and Climate Change, Report under Article
173 of the Energy transition Act for the year 2016”, http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/Report-2016-article173-lte.pdf and FRR 2016 press release: http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/FRR_Carbon_Footprint.pdf.
380 Ibid at 7.

65

Climate change presents both risks and opportunities across asset classes. There are clear benefits
to investing in companies that prioritize energy efficiency and reduction of GHG emissions and that
develop sustainable business models. Shareholder action on climate change can help to minimize
risk and ensure that portfolio companies are working towards cost-effective and innovative climate
solutions.
There is growing consensus that companies should also expressly report on their strategies to
address how they are meeting their climate risk mitigation responsibilities.381 For example, in 2016,
SHARE engaged with 28 companies across a range of sectors on the importance of measuring,
disclosing and reducing their climate risks.382 SHARE reports that in 2016, 18 of these companies
reported to the CDP Climate Change survey;383 nine companies reduced their GHG emissions; five
companies substantially expanded disclosure on key climate performance indicators; and two
companies set new company-wide targets to reduce GHG emissions.384 A growing number of
shareholder resolutions calling for enhanced disclosure regarding climate change risk and
management.385 Through its proxy voting service, in 2016, SHARE executed votes in favour of 34
shareholder proposals on climate change-related matters.386
Transparency requirements draw fiduciaries’ attention to climate risk and serve as a normative
influence on fiduciaries to take action. Institutional investors with three trillion dollars under
management have launched the Carbon Asset Risk project, calling on the world’s top nonrenewable energy companies to assess the risks of climate change to their businesses. 387
Institutional investors globally are beginning to protect their portfolios from the risks of global
warming and climate change.388
381
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Of course, many institutional investors are not fiduciaries in the same sense as pension plans, in
terms of prudential obligations to act in the interests of multigenerational beneficiaries. However,
they are concerned with effective management and the sustainability of their investment
portfolios. As noted above, the legislation in France and being considered in other jurisdictions is
not confined to pension fiduciaries. Institutional investors such as mutual funds must also report
on how their investment decision-making is directed at moving towards lower carbon emissions
and increased sustainability.
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report sets out a number of recommendations for
institutional investors. Relevant for this discussion on climate risk and fiduciary obligation are that
institutional investors should: publish commitments to integration and responsible investment
regarding climate change risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with
fiduciary duties. Investors should implement these commitments effectively in their investment
processes; monitor how investment managers are implementing these commitments; and report
to beneficiaries on how these commitments have been implemented and the resultant outcomes.
They should ensure that trustees, boards and executives have the resources and knowledge to
hold investment managers and advisers to account on climate-related issues; and require
companies to provide robust, credible and detailed accounts of their management of climate
risk.389 Institutional investors should also engage policymakers on issues relevant to long-term
performance, including strengthened corporate reporting in respect of climate change risk.390
These recommendations, if implemented by institutional investors in Canada, would go a long way
toward helping Canadian companies and asset funds make the transition to a lower carbon
economy, therefore benefiting beneficiaries.
The report recognizes that asset owners have significant freedom to decide how they wish to take
account of ESG issues in their investment practices and processes; but they should pay close
attention to decisions that lead to skews in portfolios and explicitly assess the implications of these
skews for the overall risk profile of the fund.391

fossil fuels and increase allocations to those with low carbon emissions. PKA, Denmark’s fourth-largest pension fund,
with €35.5bn in assets, asked 53 companies that generate between 25 and 50% of their revenues from coal to provide
plans on how they will reduce their exposure to the fossil fuel, and has announced that it will pull money from businesses
that lack plans or provide inadequate proposals “for the shift to a low-carbon future”. PKA also divested itself of 31 coalonly companies in 2015. Chris Flood, “Sweden’s AP4 pension fund avoids fossil fuels in landmark move”, Financial Times,
18 July 2016.
389 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 240 at 20.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
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i.

Financial intermediaries

Financial intermediaries, who manage money on behalf of others or give advice, have an obligation
to include considerations of sustainability as part of their duty to their beneficiaries and clients. 392
A European Commission report observes that another challenge is the pursuit of financial returns
in the presence of market failures, often leading fiduciaries to take action that avoids weaker shortterm returns or losses while ignoring the long-term consequences.393 It observes that “climate
change and its related risks have become a crucial issue in fiduciaries’ decision-making process”,
and the liability or litigation risk places an obligation on fiduciaries to consider climate-related risks
as part of their fiduciary duty, stating that failure to do so could potentially lead to claims for
damages by beneficiaries and clients of financial institutions who may not have acted in their best
interests.394 It suggests extending the definition of the prudent person principle, namely that
“fiduciaries should throughout their decision-making process consider the broad range of longterm interests of their beneficiaries. In doing so, it should be made clear to financial actors that
the long-term interests of beneficiaries include not despoiling the planet and exploiting their fellow
human beings”.395
Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century contains a list of recommendations for intermediaries, such as
legal advisors, actuaries, investment consultants, stock exchanges, brokers and data providers. The
report points out that they should report to their fiduciary clients on how these commitments have
been implemented and the implications for the research and advice provided. Intermediaries
should advise fiduciaries that, as an integral part of their duties, they need to analyze and account
for long-term value drivers, including climate change risk issues, in their investment practices and
processes. Intermediaries should support research on the relationship between ESG issues and
investment performance, and on the relationship between engagement and corporate
performance. They should support efforts to change market views on ESG issues by making these
issues an integral part of professional training, an integral part of codes of professional ethics; and
raise market awareness of the investment case for ESG integration.396 These recommendations are
very important. If pension fiduciaries are relying on these intermediaries for expert advice and the
intermediaries fail to develop that knowledge and skill to give that advice, the current pattern of
investor risk from climate change will be reinforced, rather than remedied. Moreover, the failure
of intermediaries to be informed of these developments and to give timely and relevant advice
could lead to erosion of the due diligence defence if a court determines that it was not reasonable
to rely on their advice.
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In 2016, one hundred PRI signatories representing USD 16 trillion of assets and six credit rating
agencies signed the “Statement on ESG in Credit Ratings”.397 The goal over the next two years is to
develop more systemic, practical and transparent incorporation of ESG into credit ratings and
analysis, recognizing that ESG factors can affect borrowers’ cash flows and likelihood of default of
debt obligations.398 Ripe for further research inquiry are the deficiencies and biases currently in
credit rating systems given the system of payment for credit rating, and the need for intermediaries
and others to correct them before ESG credit rating becomes more accurate and thus helpful to
addressing climate-related financial risk.

ii.

Portfolio Investment and Fiduciary Obligation

Waitzer and Sarro observe that there is now broad-based acceptance of the idea that most
investment returns come from general exposure to the market (beta), rather than from seeking
market benchmark outperformance strategies (alpha).399 Thus, systemic market factors are
critically important to fiduciary responsibility in assessing the impact of investment decisions on
intergenerational beneficiaries. In this respect, the definition of prudence in the duty of care has
evolved as our understanding of investment risk has changed.400 Under modern portfolio theory,
fiduciaries must weigh risk by looking at the portfolio as a whole, to ensure that it is appropriate
for beneficiaries and designed to generate a suitable rate of return without creating an undue risk
of loss.401 Asset classes of higher duration often yield the highest private and societal returns. 402
Decisions regarding investments must look beyond current market benchmarks and consider
questions of future value, including systemic, governance and market risks, as well as potential
benefits to current and future generations.403 Fiduciaries charged with managing and advising
investment vehicles that encompass multiple generations of beneficiaries, like pension plans, must
therefore consider the intergenerational implications of their decisions or advice, importing the
principle of intergenerational equity into the duty of loyalty.404 Thus the duty of loyalty requires
fiduciaries to take proactive steps to invest and encourage investment for the long term, serving
the best interests of their beneficiaries by charting a course whereby investment decisions take
account of important social and economic challenges, including sustainable development.405
Waitzer and Sarro also advocate that the fiduciary of the future needs to be an ethical fiduciary,
recognizing its responsibility to preserve and build on the social and environmental infrastructure.
397
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398 Ibid.
399 Waitzer and Sarro, supra note 97 at 1093.
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That includes a natural environment capable of sustaining their operations, an education system
that prepares the potential labour base for the workforce, and a stable, equitable economy capable
of sustaining a strong consumer base for the enterprise’s products or services. Otherwise, the
financial sector will have enormous difficulty finding worthwhile investment opportunities.406 They
suggest that it implies a normative duty to help preserve this infrastructure by ensuring that
externalities are properly priced and moral failures are addressed, by taking a more integrative
approach to investment.407 Fiduciaries should be identifying opportunities to mobilize and allocate
more of the resources they control for broader social, economic, and environmental goals as part
of their investment strategy. Waitzer and Sarro argue that it will require a shift from the zero-sum
culture that has crept into finance, towards a fiduciary culture where service providers place a
premium on treating clients fairly.408
That fairness norm is reflected in the investment strategy of Alberta Investment Management
Corporation, (“AIMCo”), one of Canada’s largest institutional investment managers with more than
$90 billion of assets under management. It is responsible for the investments of 26 pension,
endowment and government funds in Alberta.409 Its investment strategy explicitly recognizes that
addressing climate change risk is part of its fiduciary obligations:
AIMCo has a fiduciary duty to satisfy the investment objectives of our pension and
endowment fund clients. We believe the time horizon, scale, and complexity of climate
change present challenges which can impact asset values and influence systemic
economic, environmental and social risk. We recognize the business imperative of
addressing climate change in our investing strategies, and view both the physical and the
regulatory risks of climate change as material to our clients’ objectives.
The physical effects of climate change have the potential to significantly impact asset value
across all asset classes and markets. For example, changes in the frequency of extreme
weather events alter probability scenarios, asset life assumptions and net present value
calculations. Investors also seek certainty regarding potential regulatory impacts on asset
value. The physical and regulatory impacts of climate change create stranded asset
scenarios for companies, leading to possible solvency issues and shrinking the investible
universe for investors. Effectively addressing climate change requires concerted action
from all actors – companies, investors and policymakers.
...
Many of the companies we invest in are pledging to support these political commitments.
Over the coming decades, climate change will present strategic risks and opportunities to
businesses. In alignment with our responsible investment pillars, AIMCo is committed to:
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▪

▪

▪

▪
▪

Integrating consideration of an asset’s climate risk and resiliency into our
investment decision making, including voting by proxy to support reasonable
proposals to limit carbon emissions (ESG integration).
Investing to support lower carbon infrastructure, such as alternative energy
solutions and eco-efficiencies to facilitate the transition to a lower carbon
economy (Positively-themed ESG investments).
Actively engaging with companies to promote climate-resilient strategies and best
environmental practices. AIMCo champions a voice over exit approach- we prefer
to engage with select companies to promote best practices and effect positive
changes, where possible, rather than divesting of applicable holdings.
(Engagement).
Reporting on climate change related Responsible Investment activities (Reporting
and Disclosure).
Participation in collaborative initiatives and support for credible climate change
policies and regulations based on achievable emissions reduction targets, water
efficiency targets, alternate energy implementation strategies and industry best
practices (Advocacy).

AIMCo is committed to addressing climate risk across our portfolios in support of Canada’s
vision and strategy to achieve a more sustainable, low carbon economy, while continuing
to focus on our fiduciary duty to our clients.410
In July 2017, the European Commission’s Expert Group on Sustainable Finance reported that failure
to consider climate-related risks may breach fiduciary duties and potentially lead to claims for
damages by beneficiaries and clients of financial institutions.411 It states that “The responsibility of
directors and investors to manage long-term sustainability risks should be enshrined in their
relevant duties, whether it is through fiduciary duty in common law or its equivalent in other legal
systems.”412 It recommends establishing a single set of principles describing the content of what a
fiduciary duty and all its related concepts entail, which can then feed into the respective relevant
laws according to the specificities of market participants, observing that regulatory authorities
need to make clear to all parties in the investment and lending chain that managing ESG risks is
integral to fulfilling fiduciary duty, acting loyally to beneficiaries and acting in a prudent manner.413
The Investment Integration Project (“TIIP”) helps institutional investors understand the feedback
loops between their investments and the planet’s overarching environmental, financial and other
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systems that make profitable investment opportunities possible.414 It has created a guide to
achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.415 Institutional investors can
conduct an audit of their climate-related activities, develop a targeted investment program on
climate change, and tailor support to institutional investors.416

iii.

The Governance Role of Debt in Climate Change Risk

Lenders also have a governance role in keeping directors and officers accountable for decisions
regarding climate-related financial risk.417 Triantis and Daniels posited that, in the past, banks
assisted in correcting governance problems of firms through their monitoring activities, superior
access to information under loan covenants, and through direct intervention with corporate
officers or exiting the relationship.418 To the extent that the bank's monitoring deterred directors
from shirking their obligations, it reduced the risk on the firm's debt, and both equity and debt
holders benefited from the bank's governance role. A fundamental assumption underlying this
notion of interactive corporate governance was that all stakeholders shared the goal of firm-value
maximization.419 For companies relying on public debt markets, while the indenture trustee often
had limited responsibility to monitor compliance, issuers frequently were required to back their
commercial paper with lines of credit from banks, with the banks serving a similar governance
role.420
Hence, the screening and monitoring activities of a lender produced positive externalities that
benefited numerous stakeholders with an interest in the corporation through the bank’s decision
to lend, which signalled to potential and existing stakeholders the quality of the borrower; through
the imposition of fixed obligations under the loan agreement that prevented managerial slack;
through security rights that constrained the ability of managers to liquidate non-cash assets or
unilaterally sell more debt; and through loan covenants and monitoring of specified prohibited
types of behaviour. Triantis and Daniels called this feature “interdependent screening” to describe
externalities that flow not only among creditors, but also from lenders to shareholders, employees
and other stakeholders.421 Therefore, there is a governance role for banks in ensuring that
directors and officers are addressing climate change risk in an effective and timely manner.422 It
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also links to the discussion above, in respect of what investors should expect of the financial
institutions in which they invest.
However, a shift in the nature of debt markets in recent years also acts as a barrier to addressing
climate change. The continual introduction of new structured financial products and the shift to
non-bank debt financing, including syndication, securitization and collateralization, have
profoundly altered the nature of debt.423 The result has been a fundamental shift in credit
relationships. For many years lending was “relational”, the bank as operating lender had an
ongoing relationship with the business and often the community in which the business was
located. That relationship meant that lender and borrower shared goals of sustaining economic
activity in the community. However, lending has radically altered. Domestic and foreign creditors
often now have little interest or direct connection with Canadian companies, their stakeholders
and the communities in which they operate.424 Their focus is on short-term returns on their
investment. In turn, there has been a loss in governance oversight of the debt by senior lenders,
as they have fully hedged their risk.425 While there are early indications that Canadian banks are
beginning to think about climate change risk in terms of their lending portfolio priorities, many of
these new types of debt have only a short-term time horizon and place pressure on corporate
officers to deliver short-term returns or repayments as a condition of financing.426
Products currently being developed, such as catastrophe bonds and climate derivatives, have
potential to advance or to hinder climate adaptation. For example, credit default swaps can help
companies manage transition risks by hedging against failed strategies to move to lower carbon
technologies. However, speculative credit default swaps can also hedge against development of
green technologies, creating incentives to cause the failure of an alternative energy initiative or
company, as the payout is higher if the business fails.427 Unlike insurance, which requires the
purchaser to have an insurable interest in the asset or business, the incentives in respect of
numerous derivatives are skewed towards immediate profit, not long-term investment. The
opaqueness, speed and sophistication of these markets makes them problematic for addressing
climate change. There is need for new principles that link transactions in the climate finance
market with sustainability goals.
Beyond the scope of this study, but ripe for research is consideration of the rapid growth in green
bond markets. Green bonds are ostensibly aimed at financing environmental projects. Examples
would be solar and other forms of clean or renewable energy; pollution reduction and prevention;
environmentally sustainable management of living natural resources; environmentally sustainable
fishery and aquaculture; terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity conservation and climate change
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adaptation.428 There are subspecies of such bonds, such as “landscape green bonds”, aimed at
environmental investment in entire landscapes, including reducing deforestation and creating
sustainable livelihoods on a scaled up and much longer term timeline.429 While green bonds are
experiencing exponential growth, there is concern that some financial products are cashing in on
a growing interest by investors in investing in sustainable businesses, while not directing the funds
as promised. “Greenwashing”, as it is called, is where businesses and financial firms offering green
bonds benefit from the growing interest, but do not necessarily invest in economic activities that
protect or enhance the environment or move us towards a lower carbon footprint.430 The financial
services firms or investment banks that sell green bonds often do not verify their sustainability.
There is an opaqueness concern - once the funds have been raised, there is often no tracking of
their use to verify whether the activities financed are carbon reducing or environmentally sound.
Any standards that exist are purely voluntary and unenforceable, and are largely financial industry
created.431 Hence, an extremely important public policy question is how to encourage sustainable
or green investing, but not have these developments set back by greenwashing actors in the
market.
The European Commission has commenced developing standards to create some oversight and
accountability regarding how to label green bonds and other green investment products.432 It is in
the process of developing EU labels for green financial products.433 The only accountability check
now is that investors decide, with imperfect information, whether a bond is sufficiently green to
meet their own investment priorities. Why mention this issue in a study on fiduciary obligation?
Because, as institutional investors consider how to shift their investment management practices
to address climate-related financial risk, part of their fiduciary obligations arguably include
ensuring that the green financial products they are investing in truly are bonds and other products
that meet their climate-related obligations.

V.

Legislators Could Clarify the Scope of the Obligations

One means by which fiduciaries may be encouraged to address climate risk would be through
legislation that clarifies the need for fiduciaries to address the issue and embeds the cost of carbon
in capital market decisions.
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Canadian provincial and federal governments have commenced addressing climate change risk.434
British Columbia imposed the first carbon tax in North America.435 The Government of Canada
announced a pan-Canadian framework that includes a national floor price on carbon.436 The
framework agrees to phase out the use of coal to produce electricity by 2030; reduce methane
and hydrofluorocarbons emissions from the extraction of oil and gas by 40-45% by 2025; create
more rigorous vehicle emissions standards; and develop models for net-zero energy building codes
by 2030.437 The federal government invested more than $31 billon in the clean technology sector
from 2010 to 2014,438 ranking sixth in the world for investment in new domestic clean energy
generation projects in 2014. Cleantech companies generated over $11 billion of revenues and
employed over 50,000 people in 2014.439
However, provincial and federal governments appear to have largely avoided any mention of
fiduciary obligation in their public references to climate change. A canvass of the public disclosures
in August 2017 found that the federal government website, including news releases, briefings and
public information, makes only brief mention of fiduciary duties in relation to climate change
risks.440 Global Affairs Canada briefly mentions climate change risks in relation to corporate social
responsibility, observing that effective management of social and environmental risks can improve
business performance, and has led to increased oversight by boards over how the company is
managing its environmental performance as part of its fiduciary responsibility.441 A 2010 study
briefly refers to climate-related risks as fiduciary obligations regarding environmental
performance.442 The federal government website also includes a 2011 document by the Network
for Business Sustainability, which observes that legal liability could arise for firms stemming from
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a breach of fiduciary duties should they fail to take impacts from climate-related risks into
account.443 The federal government’s website discusses its fiduciary duties related to First Nations,
Inuit and other areas of sole federal responsibility in the context of climate change, but does not
discuss the obligations of corporations, pensions and other fiduciaries regarding climate change
risk.444
Under the Alberta Government Climate Leadership Plan, all pollution from coal-fired electricity will
be phased out by 2030, and 30% of electricity used by Albertans will come from renewable sources
such as solar, wind and hydro by 2030.445 The Alberta Government website does not discuss
fiduciary obligations in relation to climate change risk in any direct way.446 Alberta’s Climate
Change Advisory Panel, in its reports and consultation process, does not mention fiduciary
obligations. Its final report focuses on a carbon tax as a means of effectively responding to climate
change.447 Alberta’s Climate Leadership Action Plan also does not discuss fiduciary obligation. 448
That is not to suggest that the Alberta Government is not active in trying to reduce GHG emissions.
In 2007, Alberta became the first jurisdiction in North America to have mandatory GHG emission
reduction targets for large emitters across all sectors.449 In June 2015, the reduction targets were
strengthened so that facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of GHG emissions per year will
have to reduce their emissions intensity by 20% per barrel by 2017.450 Companies unable to comply
with the target through direct emissions reductions can use recognized offsets or pay a CAD
30/tonne fee by 2017 into its Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund. The fund is
investing in technologies and projects that will further reduce GHG emissions.451 The fund has
collected more than CAD 577 million as of April 2015.452 In November 2015 the Government of
Alberta released a climate change policy that moves towards phasing out coal-generated
443
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electricity, implementing a new carbon price on GHG pollution, placing a hard-cap on oil sands
GHG emissions and reducing methane gas emissions from oil and gas operations by 45%.453
Ontario has a five-year plan to fight climate change, reduce greenhouse gas pollution and
transition to a low-carbon economy.454 The Ontario five-year climate action plan and climate
change strategy do not mention fiduciary duties, focusing on carbon pricing as the means to reduce
GHG emissions in businesses.455 The closest it comes is in a discussion of carbon pricing, which
mentions that carbon pricing “reduces greenhouse gas emissions as businesses and households
incorporate the cost of emitting carbon into their decisions, encouraging companies and
consumers to move away from fossil fuels and towards cleaner and more efficient ways of doing
business.”456 Ontario’s five-year plan actively seeks to reduce GHG emissions and transition the
province to a low-carbon economy.457
Some provincial governments have legislatively addressed treatment of stranded assets, an issue
increasingly important. Yet fossil fuel companies are spending significant resources to challenge
these efforts.458 In upholding the validity of the legislation, the courts have observed that the
treatment of stranded assets is, at its foundation, a policy issue informed by public interest
considerations. At the same time, provincial legislation is being “trumped” by federal insolvency
law as companies fail,459 such that the costs of many stranded assets are likely to fall on taxpayers
through the tax base as we transition our economy.460
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador’s website, Turn Back the Tide, offers tools for
businesses and others in the province to address climate change. It mentions the Gold and
Scotchmer report, discussed above, highlighting the report’s conclusions that pension fund
managers and trustees owe a legal duty to their clients to assess all potential risks and
opportunities, including those posed by climate change.461
In May 2017, the Nova Scotia Public Service Superannuation Plan (“PPSP”) issued a statement on
climate change, stating that:
The Trustee has a fiduciary obligation to present and future beneficiaries of the
PSSP to maximize investment returns without incurring undue risk. To manage
risk, the Trustee maintains a well-diversified portfolio. But the Trustee is also
keenly aware of climate change as an investment risk, potentially jeopardizing
returns over the long term. The Trustee further believes that a gradual global shift
453
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away from carbon-based energy, as well as other effects of climate change, will
present opportunities to the Plan.”462
It notes that climate change has affected the trustee’s mandate to enhance assets in a risk-prudent
matter, and that it will monitor and manage the risks associated with climate change.463
Significantly, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada in March 2018 reported that, on the basis
of current government policies and actions, Canada is not expected to meet its 2020 target for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and that substantially more effort is needed. 464 A
collaboration among 11 Auditors General across Canada, the report concludes that no government
in Canada has met all its climate change commitments; many that have set GHG reduction targets
are not on track to meet them, and none of them are fully prepared to adapt to the impacts of a
changing climate.465 Most provinces have developed high-level mitigation strategies that include
actions to reduce emissions, but they lack detailed timelines, implementation plans, and cost
estimates. The Auditor Generals conclude that meeting the 2030 target will require a joint and
significant effort by all levels of government.466
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report identifies some challenges to ensuring that fiduciaries
carry out their prudential duties, recommending government action to modernize definitions and
interpretations of fiduciary duty in a way that ensures these duties are relevant to 21st century
investors.467 It makes a number of recommendations for legislators and regulators that are
relevant to climate change risk:
•
•
•
•
•

Clarify that fiduciaries must analyse and take account of ESG issues in their investment
processes, in their active ownership activities, and in their public policy engagement.
Clarify that fiduciary duty requires that investors pay attention to long-term
investment value drivers, including ESG issues.
Encourage or require institutional investors to support public policy efforts promoting
responsible investment.
Require investor transparency on all aspects of ESG integration and investment
practice.
Require better corporate reporting on ESG issues and on how these issues affect
business performance over the short and long term.
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•
•

•
•

•

Heighten expectations of trustee competence and skill.
Better implement existing responsible investment legislation and policy instruments,
such as stewardship codes and asset owner disclosure requirements, and clarify that
these laws and instruments refer to environmental, social and governance issues, and
analyse and report on how these affect investor and company performance.
Support efforts to harmonize national and regional responsible investment legislation
and policy instruments, eg stewardship codes and disclosure requirements.
Develop an international statement or agreement on the duties that fiduciaries owe
to their beneficiaries, reinforcing the core duties of loyalty, prudence and competence
and stressing that investors must pay attention to long-term investment value drivers,
including ESG issues, in their investment processes, in their active ownership activities
and in their public policy engagement. This statement should reinforce the core duties
of loyalty and prudence; and should stress that investors must pay attention to longterm investment value drivers, including ESG issues, in their investment processes, in
their active ownership activities, and in their public policy engagement.468
Support the development of guidance on implementation processes: investment
beliefs, long-term mandates, integrated reporting and performance.469

The report had recommendations specific to Canada that were drafted by consulting investor and
other groups that have already been engaged in investor action in Canada.470 Recommendations
include that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada and the relevant
pension regulators in each province should clarify that asset owners are expected to pay attention
to long-term factors, including ESG factors, in their decision-making, and in the decision-making of
their agents; and that the federal government and the governments of the provinces should follow
the example set by Ontario and introduce ESG disclosure legislation.471
For each of the recommendations for legislators and regulators, the requirements proposed above
could be tailored to expressly require fiduciaries to identify and address climate-related financial
risk in the exercise of their obligations. It would go some measure towards directing fiduciaries’
attention to the risks and the need for mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Companies respond positively to legislative standards, as they create a level playing field across all
businesses and because they serve as a counter-balance to investor pressure for short-term
returns. Absent regulatory requirements to reduce emissions and shift to green technologies,
companies are unlikely to redirect their resources. Mark Carney has observed that by the time
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climate change becomes a clear danger to financial stability, it may already be too late to stabilize
the atmosphere.472
Another area for government action is through mandatory disclosure requirements under
Canadian securities law, a requirement being advocated by institutional investors in Canada. One
2017 study by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada of more than 75 publicly-traded
companies in Canada found that while 79% were making some climate-related disclosure,
disclosure was generally inadequate.473 The vast majority failed to provide specific disclosure about
oversight of climate-related risks, financial metrics for GHG emissions reductions or targets to
move towards a lower carbon economy.474
Canadian securities regulators lag international developments in disclosure on climate change risk.
On 5 April 2018, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) published its long-awaited study of
climate-change in Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate change-related Disclosure
Project.475 Over one year in the making, with extensive consultations with issuers and investors,
securities regulators acknowledged the importance of climate-change financial risk, but they did
not announce any new requirements. The CSA observed that although securities laws in Canada
do not specifically address climate change, the general requirement to disclose material
information requires disclosure of the material climate change-related risks and impacts.476 At the
same time, it reported that substantially all users consulted are dissatisfied with the current state
of disclosure. The CSA announced that it intends to consider new disclosure requirements
regarding non-venture issuers’ corporate governance practices in relation to climate change risk,
and how issuers oversee the identification, assessment and management of material risks, but
wrote that “there is no assurance that any new rules or amendments will ultimately be adopted in
any of the CSA jurisdictions.”477 While it is understandable that any potential new rules will need
to follow the CSA’s standard policy-making process, the CSA missed an important opportunity to
state the principles that will drive the reform or to announce that it will require companies to
disclose their governance and oversight of climate change-related risks and how they are
contributing (or not) to Canada’s climate targets.
Models exist that the CSA could have endorsed. For example, since October 2013, UK quoted
companies (publicly-traded companies) have been required to report on their GHG emissions as
part of their annual directors’ report and account publicly for their contributions to climate change
on an annual basis.478 The requirement affects all UK incorporated companies listed on the main
472
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market of the London Stock Exchange, a European Economic Area market or whose shares are
dealing on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ.479 Directors and officers must make every
reasonable effort to acquire all material data to comply with the regulations.480 They are also
required to report on environmental matters to the extent it is necessary for an understanding of
the company’s business in their annual report, including where appropriate, the use of key
performance indicators.481 In circumstances where directors and officers find it difficult to compile
all necessary data in a timely manner to comply with reporting requirements, they are to state
what is omitted and explain why in the directors’ report.482
The CSA review did offer some new data. While over half of the issuers it examined provide some
specific climate change-related disclosure in their MD&A and/or Annual Information Form, the
other half use boilerplate disclosure or no disclosure at all.483 Almost no companies disclose their
governance and risk management practices respecting climate change. The majority of issuers that
mention climate change-related risks in their regulatory filings do not quantify the potential
financial impact of those risks. The CSA noted an incomplete understanding by some issuers of the
implications of climate change-related risks and financial impacts that may affect issuers’
businesses irrespective of the carbon intensity of their own operations.484
Importantly, the CSA did acknowledge the fiduciary obligations associated with the assessment of
materiality:
In fulfilling their oversight functions, audit committees, boards and certifying officers
should consider, among other things, the assessment management has made regarding
the materiality of climate change related matters, and whether the disclosure made in
securities regulatory filings is consistent with this assessment.485
Canadian securities regulators are caught up in the “materiality” issue under Canadian securities
disclosure legislation. Yet insights from reports internationally and from investors surveyed by the
CSA make clear that the current materiality standard does not work for climate-related financial
risks, given both the timelines and the existence of risk across the entire economy. As noted earlier,
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climate-change disclosure could be treated similarly to corporate governance disclosure, which is
not subject to a materiality standard in Canada.
Canadian securities regulators should adopt the recommendations of the TCFD, which provide a
framework for disclosure of climate-related financial risks by corporations, financial enterprises,
investors and asset managers.486 SHARE has been facilitating a group of large Canadian pension
plans and other institutional investors to ask Canadian securities regulators to adopt new
requirements for large issuers, to advocate for an update to company disclosure obligations and
guidance to address climate change-related concerns.487 An enhanced framework for disclosure is
critically important, but it is not a sufficient measure by itself to address the challenges regarding
climate finance. There needs to be a deeper discussion about the role of financial markets in
addressing climate risk, and the allocation of responsibility as between public and private interests.
Other jurisdictions are considering regulatory change to reflect developing notions of fiduciary
obligation. The European Commission, as part of its Capital Markets Union initiative, is considering
new regulation specifying that fiduciary duties of asset owners and asset managers include
integrating ESG considerations into decision-making, which includes climate change risk; ensuring
that sustainability is more central to corporate governance; and promoting better integration of
ESG performance in issuer ratings and key market benchmarks.488 The Commission’s High-Level
Expert Group on Sustainable Finance has recommended that the fiduciary duties of institutional
investors and asset managers explicitly integrate long-term sustainability, including climate-related
factors.489 It has recommended that in the drafting of new legislative provisions on fiduciary duty,
a “think sustainability first” principle should be applied to all key investor and financial
legislation.490
SHARE has been meeting with federal government officials and Members of Parliament to
advocate for similar ESG disclosure regulations for federally registered pension plans.491
Also, there needs to be fairness measures for smaller retail investors. With the diminution of
pension funds, individuals forced to turn to capital markets to generate some return in preparation
for retirement are not being given investment options appropriate to their risk bearing capacity.492
There needs to be regulatory oversight of the financial products for the transitioning economy, to
ensure that retail investors do not unnecessarily suffer losses. A very important step is for Canada
to follow the rest of the world and impose a fiduciary obligation on investment advisors to consider
the best interests of their clients when giving investment advice.493 That advice should pay
attention to climate risk as well as other financial risks to the retail investor.
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Mutual funds in Canada should be required to make their proxy voting records public in an
accessible form. Given that such disclosures are currently available only to unitholders, prospective
purchasers are unable to evaluate the degree to which such funds are aligning their voting in
support of climate change mitigation and adaptation. As in France, all institutional investors could
be required to disclose their climate change risk management strategies and actions, and ensure
that the decision-making board or advisory board designates someone with climate change
competency to sit on the board.
Very important to note, but beyond the scope of this study, is that GHG emissions are a global
challenge, requiring a shared global solution. While the Canadian oil sands contributed about 9.3%
of Canada’s total GHG emissions in 2014, that amount is equal to approximately 0.1% of global
emissions.494 The Canadian Government observes that all countries, governments, Indigenous
peoples, as well as civil society, business and individuals will have to be mobilized in order to
achieve significant reductions in global GHG emissions.495

VI.

Conclusion

Climate-related financial risk exists, and it will continue to grow as Canada transitions to a low
carbon economy. Directors and officers, pension trustees and other fiduciaries have a fiduciary
obligation to identify the risks, and where they exist, to develop strategies in the best interests of
the company, pension fund or investment fund to reduce the risk. Duly diligent efforts by these
fiduciaries will not be second-guessed by the courts, and thus the best strategy is to avoid liability
risk by acting now.
There are also significant opportunities for Canadian business in the transition to a low carbon
economy. Efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change will produce new opportunities for
organizations through resource efficiency and cost savings,496 investing in technological
innovation, the adoption of low-emission energy sources,497 the development of new low-emission
products and services, and access to new markets as sectors shift to a lower-carbon economy and
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build resilience along the supply chain.498 Good governance suggests that directors and other
fiduciaries address these upside potential opportunities to offset transition risks and costs.
Climate-related opportunities will vary depending on the region, market, and industry in which an
organization operates.499
It may take time for an appellate court judgment to alert directors and officers of the extent of
their fiduciary and other obligations in respect of climate change related financial risk. Canada’s
governments could help clarify the scope of obligations by either expressly legislating that
companies address climate change financial risk or expressly requiring directors and officers to
identify material climate-related risks and develop strategies to manage them. At a minimum, they
should legislate the relevant disclosure requirements recommended by the TCFD. While directors,
officers, pension trustees and other fiduciaries have an obligation to identify and address climate
change risk under their existing duties, the federal government could offer clear guidance on the
scope of their obligations.
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